Intentional and Unintentional Side-Channels in Embedded Systems by Becker, Georg Tobias
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Doctoral Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 
April 2014 
Intentional and Unintentional Side-Channels in Embedded 
Systems 
Georg Tobias Becker 
University of Massachusetts - Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2 
 Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Becker, Georg Tobias, "Intentional and Unintentional Side-Channels in Embedded Systems" (2014). 
Doctoral Dissertations. 1. 
https://doi.org/10.7275/e9x4-r283 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/1 
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL




Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 2014
Electrical and Computer Engineering
c© Copyright by Georg Tobias Becker 2014
All Rights Reserved
INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL




Approved as to style and content by:
Christof Paar, Chair
Wayne P. Burleson, Member
Kevin Fu, Member
Prof. Christopher V. Hollot, Department
Chair
Electrical and Computer Engineering
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It is finally done. After four years of being a PhD student (and many more being
an undergraduate and master student) I realize while writing these lines that I am no
student any more. I could even call myself “Dr. Becker” — strange. Of course, I have
not done it all by myself. I have many people to thank for their help and support.
First of all, I want to thank my parents for their great support throughout my
educational career and life in general. I can count myself lucky having such supportive
and caring parents! Vielen Dank!
Next, it is time to thank my advisor Christof Paar for making this PhD possible. I
especially want to thank him for his encouragement and his oversight of “hot topics”.
I also want to thank my second advisor Wayne Burleson for his support and guidance
and his help in becoming (at least partially) a hardware guy. I can now call myself
without a guilty conscience an electrical and computer engineer. Many thanks also to
my third committee member Kevin Fu for many interesting discussions in the SPQR
meetings.
Being a member of a lab makes the PhD much more enjoyable. Therefore I have
to thank all current and former members of the VCSG group. Special thanks deserves
“meine Leidensgenossin” Gesine as well as Vikram and Ibis. I also want to thank “my
second lab” in Bochum (both EMSEC and SHA). It has always been fun to come to
Bochum and, believe it or not, I have even learned a lot during my visits. Many
thanks also to the computer science members of the SPQR group.
This thesis would not have been possible if I would not have had help in my
research. I therefore want to thank all of you who have helped in my research, espe-
iv
cially my co-authors: Wayne Burleson, Tim Gu¨neysu, Markus Kasper, Ashwin Lak-
shminarasimhan, Lang Lin, Oliver Mischke, Amir Moradi, Christof Paar, Francesco
Regazzoni, Sudheendra Srivathsa, Daehyun Strobel and Vikram B. Suresh.
I would also like to thank CRI for a great internship as well as the students of
my Security Engineering class for their patience with me (I really hope you enjoyed
the class as I did). Last not least I want to thank my siblings, my “old friends” in
Germany, as well as my “new friends” in the US for helping me keeping sane. Due to









Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Christof Paar
Side-channel attacks have become a very important and well-studied area in com-
puter security. Traditionally, side-channels are unwanted byproducts of implementa-
tions that can be exploited by an attacker to reveal secret information. In this thesis,
we take a different approach towards side-channels. Instead of exploiting already
existing side-channels, they are inserted intentionally into designs. These intentional
side-channels have the nice property of being hidden in the noise. Only their imple-
menter can make use of them. This makes them a very interesting building block for
different applications, especially since they can also be implemented very efficiently.
In this thesis, techniques to build intentional side-channels for embedded software de-
signs, RTL level hardware designs, as well as layout level hardware implementations
are presented. The usefulness of these techniques is demonstrated by building effi-
cient side-channel based software and hardware watermarks for intellectual property
vi
protection. These side-channel based watermarks can also be extended to be used as
a tool to detect counterfeit ICs, another problem the embedded system industry is
facing. However, intentional side-channels also have malicious applications. In this
thesis, an extremely stealthy approach to build hardware Trojans is introduced. By
only modifying the IC below the transistor level, meaningful hardware Trojans can
be built without adding a single transistor. Such hardware Trojans are especially
hard to detect with currently proposed Trojan detection mechanisms and highlight
not only the fact that new Trojan detection mechanisms are needed, but also how
stealthy intentional side-channels can be.
Besides intentional side-channels, this thesis also examines unintentional side-
channels in delay based Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). PUFs have emerged
as an alternative to traditional cryptography and are believed to be especially well
suited for counterfeit protection. They are also often believed to be more resistant
to side-channel attacks than traditional cryptography. However, by combining side-
channel analysis with machine learning, we demonstrate that delay based PUFs can
be attacked, using both active as well as passive side-channels. The results not only
raise strong doubt about the side-channel resistance and usefulness of delay based
PUFs, but also show how powerful combining side-channel analysis techniques with
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Embedded systems are being increasingly used in a wide range of applications.
Embedded systems range from smart-phones with GHz multi-core processors, over
intelligent refrigerators and coffee makers to medical devices or smart cards for pay-
ment systems. The general trend towards more and more devices having computa-
tion power was first summarized as the trend of ubiquitous and pervasive computing.
Nowadays the term Internet of Things is increasingly used instead. This new term
indicates that most devices will not only have some kind of computation and com-
munication ability, but that they will all be connected through a single huge network
— the Internet. Many other notations come along with this trend, such as the smart
notations like smart cities, smart grids or smart house. These ideas have in common
that the deployment of a network of embedded devices with some kind of sensor,
communication and computation ability increases the efficiency of larger systems —
making them smarter.
The trend towards a large number of interconnected embedded systems creates
many opportunities. However, there also come many challenges with this trend.
As more applications enter the embedded system market, more products have to be
developed in a very competitive industry. The time-to-market needs to be short to be
able to keep up with the innovations, while at the same time the costs need to be kept
low to remain competitive. Hence, embedded systems need to be designed faster and
more efficiently while the complexity of the designs grows. This results in the need of
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an increased re-use of designs. Companies cannot afford to develop everything on their
own and from scratch, but need to obtain some functionality from third parties, e.g.,
in form of software for embedded systems or IP-cores for hardware implementations.
This interchanging of intellectual property between companies raises the question
of how it can be efficiently protected. Intellectual property protection is important
especially in an industry that heavily relies on constant innovation.
The increasing complexity of embedded systems as well as the increased use of
IP-cores from third-parties also opens new doors for hardware Trojans. Hardware
Trojans are malicious alterations of the physical design that compromise the secu-
rity or safety of the attacked device. Hardware Trojans are an increasing concern in
government and industry and has gained increasing attention in the research commu-
nity [2, 3, 6, 49]. A major concern is that a foreign government might put pressure on
their IT industry to provide hidden backdoors to specific products manufactured in
their country. However, so far there is only anecdotal evidence that hardware Trojans
have already been deployed by governments. While a lot of research has focused on
detecting hardware Trojan, there still seems a gap in the knowledge of how hardware
Trojans can be implemented efficiently. A solid understanding of how hardware Tro-
jans can be build is a requirement to judge the different Trojan detection mechanisms.
In this thesis, new techniques to build extremely stealthy hardware Trojans are pre-
sented that will help to close this gap and enable researchers to build more efficient
detection mechanisms that can also thwart these new types of hardware Trojans.
The trend towards embedded systems also introduces new security related prob-
lems. Unlike personal computers (PCs) and servers, embedded systems are no longer
solely located in areas with restricted physical access such as homes or workplaces.
Instead, they are often carried around or might be located at publicly accessible spots.
Hence, when evaluating the security of these devices, it needs to be assumed that an
attacker might have physical access to the device he is trying to attack. And this
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leads to many new attack vectors such as side-channel attacks, probing attacks or
fault-injection attacks.
Besides intellectual property protection and hardware Trojans this dissertation
focuses on an aspect of hardware security that is one of the major concerns and
research areas in hardware security: side-channel analysis. In a side-channel analysis
an attacker exploits the fact that an embedded device is not a black-box that obtains
defined inputs and only produces defined outputs. Instead, every physical system
that performs some kind of computation will inevitably leak additional information
over physical channels, such as the power consumption, the required execution time,
or the thermal profile. In side-channel analysis, these physical properties are first
measured and then exploited to derive additional information about the embedded
system. Such information could, for example, be the secret key that is used in an
encryption algorithm.
Unlike most previous work, this dissertation does not only look at side channels
as an unwanted byproduct of a physical implementation. Instead, side channels are
introduced intentionally into embedded systems. Interestingly, these intentional side
channels can be used in constructive ways, e.g., for intellectual property protection
in embedded systems. Hence, this dissertation shows how a method that has been
primarily used in a malicious way to attack systems can be used for protection in-
stead. However, intentional side-channels can also be used maliciously by introducing
techniques to build extremely small and stealthy hardware Trojans. The fact that in-
tentional side-channel can be used for both, constructive and malicious applications,
highlights the flexibility and usability of side-channels.
In addition to these intentional side-channels a novel way to combine side-channel
analysis and machine learning algorithms is presented to attack delay based Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs). PUFs have emerged as an alternative to traditional
security. Due to process variations, every chip has slightly different characteristics.
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Strong PUFs harvest these process variations so that every chip can be uniquely iden-
tified using a challenge-and-response protocol. However, the most promising string
PUF, the Arbiter-PUF, can easily be attacked using machine learning algorithms if
the attacker has access to challenge-and-response pairs. Nevertheless, Arbiter-PUFs
have some very promising properties such as the fact that no secret key needs to
be programmed and stored and it is often argued that PUFs have a high resistance
against implementation attacks. However, as we will see in this dissertation, Arbiter-
PUFs can be attacked by combining side-channel analysis with machine learning
algorithms. Therefore this dissertation raises strong doubts about the assumption
that PUFs are more resistant against implementation attacks.
1.2 Organization and Contribution of the Thesis
The three main contributions in this thesis:
1. Introduced an easy and reliable way to detect IP theft in embedded systems
by using side-channel based watermarks for hardware as well as software im-
plementations. Unlike most other watermarks, to detect these watermarks a
verifier only needs to have physical access to the IC under test.
2. Developed extremely stealthy dopant-based hardware Trojans that are not de-
tected by the hardware Trojan detection mechanisms proposed in the literature.
Two case-studies were used to highlight their versatility and show that meaning-
ful hardware Trojans can be build with this new Trojan technique. These new
Trojans give valuable insight for developing new Trojan detection mechanisms .
3. By combining side-channel analysis with machine learning attack we demon-
strated that delay based PUFs are not considerably more resistant against
implementation attacks as it often believed. These new discoveries raise the
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question how promising delay based PUFs really are to build secure challenge-
and-response protocols in embedded systems.
All contribution have two things in common. From a technical perspective, they
all use side-channel analysis in an unconventional way, i.e., by inserting the side-
channels intentionally into the design1 or by combining side-channel analysis with
machine learning attacks. From an application perspective, they are all directly
related to problems arising from the embedded system development process, i.e., IP-
Theft, hardware Trojans, and anti-counterfeiting.
The main application for constructive use of intentional side-channels in this work
are watermarks for intellectual property protection. In Chapter 3 a robust hardware
watermark technique is introduced that is inserted by adding only a few additional
gates to a hardware design. The main advantage of a side-channel based hardware
watermark compared to other hardware watermarking techniques is that side-channel
watermarks can be inserted at the Hardware Description Language (HDL) level while
they can be efficiently detected in a fabricated chip. Most watermarks previously
proposed could only be detected at the same level they were inserted. Hence, many
watermarks can not be detected efficiently after manufacturing, making them imprac-
tical for most scenarios. Therefore the introduced side-channel watermarks have a
great potential in protecting the intellectual property of hardware designs.
The idea of side-channel based watermarks is extended towards embedded software
designs in Chapter 4. These side-channel based software watermarks are the first
software watermarks that are specifically designed for embedded applications. Unlike
most proposed techniques, side-channel software watermarks can be embedded at the
assembly level and do not need to be added in a higher programming language such
as Java. Furthermore, no access to the program code or memory structure is needed
1The dopant-based hardware Trojan can be used to build intentional side-channels at the layout
level. However, these dopant Trojans also have applications beyond side-channels.
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to detect the watermark. The watermark can be detected by simply having physical
access to a device that executes the suspected code. This provides a major advantage
since in embedded systems the access to the program memory is often restricted,
making them a very useful tool to detect software theft in embedded systems.
Chapter 5 examines how to efficiently build hardware Trojans. A novel hardware
Trojan technique based on dopant modification is introduced, that can be used to
build extremely stealthy Trojans. The major advantage of this new Trojan is the ease
of insertion during chip manufacturing. Further, compared to insertion of additional
transistors or modification of metal layer, modifying only the dopant layer makes
the trojan significantly harder to detect using existing reverse engineering techniques.
The technique of building hardware Trojans by manipulating the dopant is introduced
in Section 5.1 followed by two case studies demonstrating the usefulness of this new
type of Trojans. In the first case study, a hidden backdoor is inserted in the digital
post-processing of a secure random number generator design derived from random
number generator used in Intel’s Ivy Bridge processors. Secret keys generated with
such a Trojan infested random number generator have a significantly lower entropy
and hence are insecure. However, the Trojan infested design will still appear legitimate
due to the fact that the design passes functional testing as well as statistical tests.
In the second case study in Section 5.2 the idea of dopant-Trojans is used to create a
hidden side-channel in an otherwise side-channel secure AES design to leaks out the
secret key. This intentional side-channel is designed in a way that it does not reduce
the side-channel resistance against the most common side-channel attacks, thereby
making the resulting design still appear legitimate and side-channel resistant to an
evaluator.
A brief summary of how to build side-channel based Hardware Trojans at the gate
level is given in Section 5.3.
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Physical Unclonable Functions have emerged as a new cryptographic primitive
that can be used among other things for anti-counterfeiting and secure device au-
thentications. In Chapter 6 passive as well as active side-channel attacks on the most
promising strong PUF design, the Arbiter-PUF are described. These new attacks
raise doubt on the assumption that PUFs are more resistant against implementation
attacks than traditional cryptographic algorithms. After the idea of Arbiter-PUFs
is explained in Section 6.1 the concept of a controlled PUF that is resistant to ma-
chine learning algorithms is introduced. This controlled PUF design serves as the
target for the combined side-channel and machine learning attacks. In Section 6.2 a
power side-channel attack attack on controlled Arbiter-PUF is demonstrated using
a combination of correlation power analysis and evolution strategies. One argument
why Arbiter-PUFs have a high resistance to implementation attacks that is often re-
peated is that any tampering with the IC will change the output behavior of the PUF.
However, in Section 6.3 we will learn that the information of which responses change
when the IC is being tampered with can actually be used by an attacker to accurately
model the PUF. Hence, the property that tampering changes the output behavior of
PUFs does not necessarily make PUFs more secure against implementation attacks
but makes PUFs vulnerable to a combined machine learning and fault attack.






Traditionally, in a cryptographic security evaluation, encryption algorithms are
treated as a black box: They only produce well defined outputs for well defined
inputs while intermediate values never leave this black box. From a cryptographic
perspective the encryption algorithm is secure if it is computationally infeasible for an
attacker to compute the key even if he has unlimited access to any chosen plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. Many cryptographic algorithms exist that are considered secure
from a cryptographic perspective. However, in 1998 Kocher et.al. [47] showed that an
actual implementation of an encryption algorithm does not behave like a black box.
It turns out that every integrated circuit (IC) that performs the encryption leaks
out additional information over so called side-channels. With the help of these side-
channels, it is possible to compute the secret key of otherwise secure cryptographic
algorithms.
The most commonly used side-channels for this type of attacks are the execution
time, the power consumption or Electro Magnetics (EM). But other side-channels
such as heat or even optical emission can be used as well. The power consumption
of an IC is not constant but instead depends on the processed data. For example, a
typical CMOS inverter has a large power consumption while it switches. But when
the transistor does not switch, the power consumption is very small. Kocher et.al. ex-
ploited this fact to successfully recover the secret key of a DES encryption engine by
measuring the power consumption and performing some statistical analysis on these
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power traces. In the next Section, this type of attack which is called Differential
Power Analysis (DPA), will be introduced. Several variants of the original attack
have been proposed over the year. One important extension is the Correlation Power
Analysis (CPA) which is mainly used in this thesis.
2.1.1 Difference-of-Mean
A Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is based on two key observations: (1) the
power consumption of an encryption algorithm depends on the processed intermediate
values and (2) these intermediate values depend on parts of the key and plaintext.
For example, assume that the power consumption of the target device is larger
when an intermediate value v is v = 1 compared to v = 0. In a difference-of-mean
attack, power measurements of the target device with many different inputs are taken
and each power trace is sorted into two piles: One pile for traces with v = 1 and one
pile for traces with v = 0. Since we know that the power consumption should be larger
for v = 1, we expect the mean (average) power consumption of the first pile to be
larger than the mean power consumption of the second pile. However, since the power
consumption of the device depends on more factors than just this one intermediate
value, it could be that some power traces in the first pile have actually a smaller
power consumption than some traces in the second pile. But by averaging over many
traces, the mean power consumption of the pile with the 1s should be larger than
the mean power consumption of the pile with the 0s. Hence, the difference of mean
between these two piles should be positive.
In an actually DPA attack the secret key is not known and hence we cannot
compute the intermediate value v. This problem is solved by guessing parts of the
key and using these guessed keys to compute the intermediate values. If the correct
key was guessed, we expect the same effect as discussed above — that the difference-
of-mean is positive. However, if we guessed the wrong key then we are essentially
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randomly sorting the power traces into two piles. If you sort a large amount of traces
randomly into two piles, the mean power consumption of the two piles should be
similar and hence the difference-of-mean should be small.
Guessing a complete cryptographic key correctly is computationally infeasible due
to the extremely large key space. However, for the DPA attack to be successful an
attacker does not have to guess the entire key at once. The targeted intermediate
valued only depend on parts of the key, e.g. 8 bits of a 128-bit key. Therefore, the
attacker only has to guess these 8 bits correctly. Since there are only 256 different
8-bit subkeys, an attacker can easily compute the difference of mean for all of these
subkeys. The correct subkey has the largest difference-of-mean and can therefore be
identified. After the first subkey has been determined, the attack is repeated for other
parts of the key. Using this divide-and-conquer approach, one subkey after the other
is revealed until the entire key is known.
2.1.2 Correlation Power Analysis
The correlation power analysis (CPA) is an extension of the DPA. The disadvan-
tage of the difference-of-mean method is that the used power model is very limited.
For example, a common power model for an intermediate value in a microcontroller is
the a Hamming wight (HW) power model, i.e. the power consumption is proportional
to the number of ones in the intermediate value. However, the difference-of-mean is
a 1-bit distinguisher and therefore cannot efficiently make use of this multiple bit
information.
A CPA on the other hand can be used with more complex power models f such as
the Hamming weight or Hamming distance model. In a CPA, for every hypothetical
intermediate value vi a hypothetical power value hi according to the power model f
is computed, hi = f(vi). If the correct power model and intermediate values are used,
then the hypothetical power values þh should be similar to the measured power values
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þx, i.e., the power values þh have a linear relation with the measured values þx. To test
the linear relation between two signals, in this case the measured power values þx and





with var indicating the sample variance and con the sample covariance. One ad-
vantage of the correlation coefficient is that it is bound between +1 and −1,i.e.,
−1 ≤ p ≤ 1. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient is directly related to signal-to-
noise ratio. This makes comparing different attacks and measurement setups easier
and also allows to compute the bound of expected correlation coefficient for false key
guesses. For wrong key guesses the correlation coefficient follows a Gaussian distri-
bution with a standard deviation of σ = 1/
√
#traces and a mean of µ = 0. This way
a boundary for the maximum correlation coefficient pwrong that can be expected for
false key guesses with a probability of 99.99% can be computed using: [51]
|pwrong| =≤ 4√
#traces
Looking at the correlation coefficients of successfully performed attacks also helps to
judge how much noise one can expect in practice. The sum of the various noise sources
in a power analysis can be approximated with a Gaussian distribution N (µN , σ2N)[74].
Hence, the power consumption follows a random variable X with X = H+N (µN , σ2N),
where H is the random variable of the assumed power model. In this specific case
the correlation coefficient can be written as:
p =
cov(H, H + N (µN , σ2N))√
var(H)var(H + N (µN , σ2N)
=
cov(H, H) + cov(H, N (µN , σ2N))√





Hence, it is possible to compute the expected correlation coefficient for a given noise
distribution N (µN , σ2N). Similarly, it is also possible to derive the noise level from
measured correlation coefficients. We will make use of this in Chapter 6 to provide
estimates of how much noise can roughly be expect in a side-channel attack on PUFs.
To do this, we use the results of successful CPA attacks on different systems to
approximate the noise in these systems and use these values as a reference.
2.2 IP-Protection
Intellectual Property (IP) protection is a major concern in many different areas.
Especially in a field driven as strongly by innovation as the IT industry, protecting
the intellectual property is essential for a successful business. There are two separate
IP related problems a company might face: On the one hand, their products could
be subject to counterfeiting. In counterfeiting, a genuine product is reproduced by
an unauthorized entity and sold under the label of the victim company. This could
be a direct copy of the genuine product, a completely different product that is simply
relabeled to resemble a product from this company, or a second-grade product that
is relabeled as first-grade. Counterfeit chips have already become a serious problem
for the IT industry and the reported incidents have grown significant over the last
years [31]. Counterfeit chips not only cost the company whose chips are being counter-
feited revenue, but can also cause serious damage for the companies that unknowingly
embedded these chips into their products. These counterfeit chips are most often less
reliable, have worse performance or are broken from the start. Hence, products with
such counterfeit parts will likely be much less reliable and have a worse performance.
This way counterfeit chips, that might just cost a few cents, can result in enormous
costs due to possible product re-calls and customer satisfaction losses.
On the other hand, their design could be stolen and illegitimately used in a product
by a different company. This IP-theft can be in the form of software or hardware IP-
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cores that are illegally resold or reused by an unauthorized company or in the form
of copying the idea of a design or patent infringements. Note that IP-theft could
also happen by accident by companies that loose track of their license agreement.
For example an IP-core that was licensed only for a particular application might be
reused in a different project by an engineer that is not aware of the specific license
agreement. But in both cases, whether the IP is illegally used by accident or by
malpractice, the owner of the company looses revenue. In this dissertation I will
introduces efficient methods to detect the illegal copying and using of software or
hardware IP-cores by means of building an intentional side-channels into the design
that serves as a watermark. While the focus of this work is on detecting IP-theft,
how intentional side-channels can be used to protect against some types of product
piracy and counterfeiting is also addressed in Section 3.3. Another anti-counterfeiting
solution that has been proposed in the literature is the use of strong PUFs. However,
as we will see in Chapter 6, how to build secure strong PUFs is still an open research
problem.
One method to protect against IP-theft is digital watermarking. Using digital
watermarks is a wide-spread concept used in many other contexts, e.g., to protect
the intellectual property of pictures, audio, or video data. The idea is to embed in-
formation, the digital watermark, into the data you want to protect in a way that
it is difficult to remove the watermark without destroying the data. This way each
copy of the data will also include the embedded watermark information. Watermarks
are most often used in copyright protection systems for digital media to deter unau-
thorized copying. In this section the concept of digital watermarking for hardware
designs as well as software designs is introduced.
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2.2.1 Hardware Watermarks
The hardware design process is an expensive and time consuming task. The in-
creasing complexity of embedded systems often prevents designing an entire chip from
scratch if one wants to stay economical. Instead, parts of the design are reused from
earlier developments or bought from other companies as so-called IP-cores (intellec-
tual property cores). These IP-cores implement specialized functionality to be used
as building blocks within integrated circuit designs. For example, Figure 2.1 shows
the architectural view of an System-On-Chip design as it it used for Smart-TVs. As
one can see, many different IP cores are combined in a single chip. IP-cores can be
separated into soft and hard IP-cores. A soft IP-core consists of an implementation in
a synthesizable register transfer language (RTL) such as Verilog or VHDL. It can be
sold either directly in an RTL format or as a generic gate-level netlist. RTL IP-cores
allow the user to adapt the licensed design to his application specific requirements,
while this is cumbersome with a netlist IP-core. Nevertheless, netlist cores, just as
RTL cores, are not restricted to a specific technology and can be ported to any pro-
cess or foundry. Hard IP-cores on the other hand are physical designs that come as
completely laid out function blocks that cannot be modified and are thus restricted
to a specific technology. Analog circuits are usually sold as hard IP-cores.
The IP-core market has risen to a multi-billion dollar business, making it a valuable
target for fraud and piracy. The threats of cloned products, IP theft, and copyright
infringement necessitate semiconductor designers and manufacturers to implement
countermeasures into their products. Several possible protection methods against
illegal IP usage have been proposed in the past. One solution to prevent IP-core theft
is to deliver encrypted IP-cores only. These IP-cores can then only be decrypted by
the tools which synthesize the design and their plain source code will therefore never
be seen by the customer [32]. However, this approach is logistically very difficult and
does not prevent customers who legally bought the IP-core from illegally sharing or
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Figure 2.1. Architectural view of Intel’s CE4100 System-On-Chip that is used in
Smart-TVs. Due to its complexity, it is not economical to develop everything from
scratch. Instead, many different IP cores are used to build the system.
reusing it for multiple designs. A promising solution proposed to counter the IP theft
threat is the concept of watermarking IP-cores [41, 60, 61, 76].
The goal of hardware watermarks is to be able to check if a given IP-core has
been used in a design. It therefore does not prevent IP-theft itself, but it enables the
detection of this theft and can help the owner to proof the theft in court.
When adapting the digital watermarking concept to protect hardware designs,
the threat to counter is unauthorized usage of IP-cores. The goal of the designer of a
circuit is therefore to be able to distinguish if his design is used in a given integrated
circuit (IC) or complete product.
The IC that needs to be tested is in most cases only available as a completely
assembled and packaged chip. Therefore, watermarks that can be detected even after
manufacturing are most useful. However, in many hardware watermarking schemes,
the watermark is implemented to protect only the high level representation of a chip
design, e.g., the digital VHDL or Verilog representation. This kind of watermark
cannot be detected in synthesized products anymore.
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When implementing a watermark-protected design, detecting unauthorized use
is the most interesting motivation. However, it is also desirable to be able to prove
towards a third party, e.g. a judge, that your design has been used. This goal is called
proof-of-ownership and is necessary to perform legal actions against the discovered
theft. We summarize the goals of IP watermarking schemes:
1. Detectability: Given an IC, the owner of an IP-core can examine whether or
not his IP-core is used in the IC.
2. Proof-of-ownership: Given an IC, the owner of an IP-core can prove to a third
party that his IP-core is used in the IC.
Consequently, attacking a watermarking scheme means to either violate the de-
tectability or proof-of-ownership goal. Violating the detectability goal is to remove
the embedded information of the watermark from the IP-core or to render it useless.
Furthermore, in a successful attack the removal of the watermark must not destroy
the functionality of the IP-core. Violating the detectability goal obviously also im-
plies breaking the proof-of-ownership property — if a verifier cannot detect the theft
he surely cannot proof the theft towards a third party. But violating the proof-of-
ownership goal on the other hand does not automatically imply that the detectability
goal is violated as well.
A short overview of different watermarking techniques for IP protection can be
found in [5]. Concepts for watermarks have been proposed for many different levels of
the hardware design process. One of the most popular schemes suited for IP-cores are
the constraint-based watermarks introduced in [41, 60]. In these schemes hardware
designs are tagged by defining additional design constraints which do not affect the
functionality of the IP-core. One major drawback of constraint based watermarks is
that the watermark can only be discovered at the same level of abstraction they were
inserted, i.e., these watermarks cannot be detected in produced chips [5]. As in most
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cases a verifier will not have access to the high abstraction levels of a suspicious inte-
grated circuit, this type of watermarking is impracticable for many scenarios. Some
hardware watermarks use side-channels for evaluation. The advantage of embedding
a watermark in the characteristics of the power consumption of a circuit is that it can
easily be detected even post-manufacturing, although being embedded at a high level
of abstraction, e.g., as a code in a hardware description language like VHDL or Verilog.
In [83] the watermark modulates the power consumption side-channel to transmit a
signature by means of On-Off Keying (OOK) and Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK)
during the reset phase of an FPGA. However, this approach is not stealthy, meaning
that the watermark is visible not only to the evaluator but to everyone. This makes
it comparably easy to remove the watermark. In [45] a watermark has been proposed
that uses temperature modulation to transmit the watermark information.
2.2.2 Software Watermarks for Embedded Devices
Software plagiarism and piracy is a serious problem, which is estimated to cost
the software industry billions of dollars per year [19]. Software piracy for desktop
computers has gained most of the attention in the past. However, software plagiarism
and software piracy is also a problem for companies working with embedded systems.
For example, many customers require access to the embedded system libraries to test
these libraries before purchasing them. However, once a company has provided these
libraries, there the company has lost direct control over it. If the customer decides to
not buy the library, the library cannot be taken back — the company simply has to
trust the customer that he does not illegally use or distribute the library.
In the following we will focus on the unique challenge to detect software plagia-
rism and piracy in embedded systems. If a designer suspects that her code has been
used in an embedded system, it is quite complicated for her to determine whether or
not her suspicion is true. Usually she needs to have access to the program code of
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the suspected device to be able to compare the code with the original code. How-
ever, program memory protection mechanisms that prevent unauthorized read access
to the program memory are frequently used in today’s microcontrollers. Hence, to
gain access to the program code of an embedded system these protection mechanisms
would have to be defeated first. This makes testing embedded devices towards soft-
ware plagiarism very difficult, especially if it needs to be done in an automated way.
Furthermore, the person who is illegally using unlicensed code might apply code-
transformation techniques to hide the fact that he is using someone else’s code. In
this case detecting the software theft is hard even if the program code is known.
Software watermarks [82] enable a verifier to test and proof the ownership of
a piece of software code. Most watermarks usually require access to the program
code [34] or the data memory [81, 21] during the execution of the program to detect
the watermark. But as mentioned before, access to the memory and the program
code is usually restricted in an embedded environment. Most software watermarks
proposed in the literature are used for higher programming languages such as Java and
C++. But in embedded applications many programs are written in C or assembly.
Furthermore, many previously proposed software watermarks have shown to be not
very robust to code-transformations [34]. Therefore software watermarks that are
suitable for PC applications might not be very suitable for embedded systems. The
side-channel based software watermarks presented in this thesis on the other hand
does not need access to the program code or memory since they can be detected using
side-channel measurements. Side-channel based watermarks can also be inserted into
assembly code, making them especially well suited for embedded applications.
2.3 Hardware Trojans
The increased use of out-sourcing and globalization in circuit manufacturing has
given rise to several trust and security issues, as each of the parties involved potentially
18
constitutes a security risk. In 2005 the Defense Science Board of the US Department
of Defense (DoD) published a report in which it publicly voiced its concern about US
military reliance on ICs manufactured abroad [2]. One threat in this context is that
malicious modifications, also referred to as hardware Trojans, could be introduced
during manufacturing. There is the risk that chips with hardware Trojans could be
introduced into the supply chain. The discovery of counterfeit chips in industrial and
military products over the last years has made this threat much more conceivable.
For instance, in 2010 the chip broker VisionTech was charged with selling fake chips,
many of which were destined for safety and security critical systems such as high-speed
train breaks, hostile radar tracking in F-16 fighter jets, and ballistic missile control
systems [31]. Hardware Trojans can also be inserted during the design phase, e.g. by
third party IP-cores, software tools, malicious employee, or by replacing legitimate
IP cores by hacking into the companies server. All this raises the question of trust
in the final chip, especially if chips for military or safety-critical civilian applications
are involved.
The threat of hardware Trojans is expected to only increase with time, especially
with the recent concerns about cyberwar, cf., e.g., [52, 72]. Recent revelations from
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden about the extent of the activities of the
NSA have gained widespread attention. There is still no hard evidence that hardware
Trojan have been inserted into computer chips. However, the NY times states based
on the documents provided by Snowden about NSA’s Sigint project that: [64]
“By this year, the Sigint Enabling Project had found ways inside some
of the encryption chips that scramble information for businesses and gov-
ernments, either by working with chipmakers to insert back doors or by
exploiting security flaws, according to the documents.”
This shows that the threat of hardware Trojans is quite real. The trust in hardware
has significantly suffered as can be seen by the move of OpenBSD to stop relying
on hardware RNG generators, not because of a poor RNG design, but because the
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OpenBSD community has lost its trust in the chip manufactures [30]. Hence, it is
important to have a more thorough understanding of hardware Trojans and hardware
backdoors so that we can start to develop new methods to regain this lost trust.
Research efforts targeting hardware Trojans can be divided into two parts, one
related to the design and the implementation of hardware Trojans, and one addressing
the problem of detecting hardware Trojans. In this section contributions from both
areas are summarized.
2.3.1 Hardware Trojan Design
There have been relatively few research reports addressing the question of creating
(as opposed to defeating) hardware Trojans, with the first hardware Trojans published
around 2008. Most proposed hardware Trojans consist of small to mid-size circuits
which are added at the HDL level. For example, in [46] a hardware Trojan for a
CPU was proposed that can grant an attacker complete control of the system from
outside. The attacker can make arbitrary changes to the program code and can get
unlimited access to the memory by simply sending a specific malicious UTP package
to the processor. This Trojan shows how vulnerable systems become ones the root
of trust — the hardware — is compromised. However, inserting such a Trojan which
consists of a few hundred gates would be very challenging at layout-level and the
additional gates can easily be detected using optical reverse-engineering. Another
class of HDL-level Trojans are those which create a hidden side-channel to leak out
secret keys by adding only a few additional gates [50]. Perhaps most of the Trojans
proposed so far were shown at the annual hardware Trojan challenge by NYU-Poly,
where students insert hardware Trojans into a target FPGA design with the goal of
overcoming hardware detection mechanisms [67].
All these Trojans have in common that they are inserted at the HDL level. The
attack scenario is here that a malicious circuitry is introduced into the design flow of
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the IC. However, these Trojans are difficult to realize by a malicious foundry which
usually only has access to the layout mask. In this context, finding the needed space
and adding extra connections to place & route the Trojan gates can be unpractical.
How realistic these Trojans are in a foundry-based attack model is therefore still
unanswered.
A more realistic scenario for a foundry-based Trojan insertion are malicious mod-
ifications carried out at layout level. An example of such a Trojan are the Trojans
proposed by Shiyanovskii et al. [73]. In this work the dopant concentration is
changed in order to increase the effects of aging on the circuit, with the ultimate goal
of reducing the expected lifetime of the device. However, these Trojans have limited
usability, since it is hard to predict the exact time the ICs will fail and they can
usually only serve as a denial-of-service type of Trojan.
2.3.2 Hardware Trojan Detection
Hardware Trojan detection mechanisms can be divided into post-manufacturing
and pre-manufacturing detection mechanisms. The input to pre-manufacturing Tro-
jan detection is usually the gate netlist or HDL description of the design under test.
Pre-manufacturing Trojan detection tries to detect Trojans that have been inserted
at the HDL level into the design flow, e.g., by third party IPs, design tools or un-
trusted employees. Usually the Trojan detection is based on functional testing or
formal verification. There have been also proposals of how to defend rather than
detect hardware Trojans at the HDL level. One approach is to replace part of the
hardware design that was not covered by functional testing by software [36]. The
other approach is to add redundancy and a control circuitry between untrusted IPs
that will make Trojan activation based on counters and inputs difficult [78]. How-
ever, these proposed Trojan detection and prevention mechanisms cannot be applied
to Trojans at the sub-gate level, such as the ones proposed in this thesis.
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Post-manufacturing Trojan detection mechanisms primarily attempt to detect
Trojans inserted during manufacturing. They can be divided into two categories
based on whether or not they need a “golden chip” (also referred to as golden model).
A golden chip is an IC which is known to not include malicious modifications. The
standard approach proposed to detect layout-level hardware Trojans and to find a
golden chip is the use of optical reverse-engineering. The idea is to decap the sus-
pected IC and make photos of each layer of the suspected chip with e.g., a scanning
electron microscope (SEM). These photos are then compared to the mask of the chip
to detect additional metal or polysilicon wires. Additional metal wires and transistors
can usually be detected very reliably. However, the overall process is expensive, time
consuming and also destroys the chip under test. Hence, this method can only be
used on a small number of chips. Also, detecting changes made to the dopant area
are usually not feasible using optical reverse-engineering, especially in an automated
way. We will exploit this fact to make our Trojan design invisible to this type of
detection mechanism.
A different approach to test for hardware Trojans without a golden chip is func-
tional testing of the chip. Functional testing is standard procedure in the IC design
flow and to some degree will always be performed. However, detecting Trojans is dif-
ferent from detecting manufacturing defects. Creating efficient test cases for hardware
Trojan detection is difficult since the tester does not know how the Trojan gates look
like. As a result, these Trojan gates are not taken into account during the test case
generation which usually tries to optimize code coverage. This leads to an inefficient
functional testing procedure in contrast to functional testing at the netlist level, since
in this case the Trojan gates will be part of the input to the test case algorithms.
Trojan detection mechanisms that require a golden chip have been suggested by
comparing side-channel information of the golden chip and the suspected chip. The
most popular method is using power side-channels for Trojan detection [7] but other
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side-channels such as time [48, 80], EM and temperature have been proposed as well.
Typically these detection mechanisms can only detect Trojans that are at most three
to four orders of magnitude smaller than the target design [7]. Small Trojans on
the other hand are likely to stay undetected. Another approach to detect Trojans
is to add a specific Trojan detection circuitry into the design that can detect if the
design was changed during manufacturing. For example, in [68] it was proposed to
add additional gates that transform parts of the design into ring-oscillators. During
testing, the frequencies of these ring-oscillators are compared with a golden chip to
detect if the design was changed. These methods usually require a golden chip to
determine the expected output of the detection circuitry, since circuit simulations are
often not accurate enough. One big disadvantage of Trojan detection circuitry is that
the circuitry itself can be subject to Trojan modifications.
For a similar reason, build-in-self-tests (BIST) that are employed in some design to
automatically detect manufacturing and aging defects are of limited use when applied
to Trojan detection. This is not only due to the fact that a Trojan can be inserted
into the BIST itself but also because the Trojan can be designed to not trigger the
BIST, since BISTs are often designed to only detect random errors.
2.4 Physical Unclonable Functions
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) have gained widespread attention in the
research community as a new cryptographic primitive for hardware security applica-
tions. PUFs make use of the fact that two manufactured computer chips are never
completely identical due to process variations. A PUF exploits these process varia-
tions to ensure that each chip has a unique behavior so that each chip can be uniquely
identified. There are many applications for which PUFs can be used. Two prominent
examples are the use in challenge-and-response protocols as well as for secure key gen-
eration and storage. The advantage of using a PUF to generate cryptographic keys
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is that the PUF ensures that each chip will have its own unique secret without the
need to program it first. Furthermore, securely storing a cryptographic key in embed-
ded devices in a way that they are resistant to physical attacks such as probing and
reverse-engineering is extremely difficult. Since with PUFs no key needs to be stored
in non-volatile memory, but instead the secret is derived from physical characteristics
which are hard to monitor, these attacks become extremely difficult.
In a challenge-and-response protocol, a user sends a challenge to the PUF and the
PUF responds with an individual response. Each PUF instance (i.e. each individual
chip) behaves differently and hence two instances will provide different responses for
the same challenge. This way each chip can be uniquely identified. In the set-up
phase the user chooses some random challenges and collects the responses for these
challenges from the PUF. When this PUF needs to be authenticated later, the user
sends a challenge he has used during the set-up phase to the PUF and compares the
response with his stored response. If the received response matches the response from
the set-up phase, the user can be sure that he is communicating with the same PUF
instance.
PUFs can be classified into two categories: weak PUFs and strong PUFs. In a
weak PUF, the number of challenges the PUFs can accept is very limited so that an
attacker can try all possible challenges and store the responses. This way an attacker
could easily forge the PUF by replacing the PUF with a simple memory look-up. A
strong PUF on the other hand has a challenge space that is large enough so that
it is computationally infeasible to try and store all possible challenges. Therefore
an attacker cannot create a look-up table for a strong PUF that models the PUF
correctly. Strong PUFs can be used in challenge-and-response protocols as well as for
key generation. A weak PUF on the other hand cannot be used for challenge-and-
response protocols but they can still be used for key generation since it is usually
sufficient to generate a limited number of different keys for each chip. Note that
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the terminology strong PUF and weak PUF might falsely give the impression that a
strong PUF is “better” than a weak PUF. However, this terminology only defines the
challenge space without judging the PUFs performance or other security properties.
Current PUF designs face two big problems that are related: they suffer from un-
reliability and are prone to machine learning attacks. In an ideal case, a PUF always
generates the same response for a given challenge. However, due to environmental
effects and thermal noise, the response to the same challenge can vary. Therefore,
error correction codes are usually needed if the PUF is used for key generation and
challenge-and-response protocols need to allow a few false response bits. The sec-
ond problem is that even strong PUFs can be modeled in software and the needed
parameters to model a specific PUF instance can rather easily be determined using
machine learning techniques if a few challenge and response pairs are known to the
attacker [71]. So far, no strong PUF has been implemented that can withstand these
machine learning attacks, making it currently impossible to use PUFs in a secure
challenge-and-response protocol.
2.4.1 Side-Channel Resistance of Physical Unclonable Functions
Despite these problems, PUFs have gained a lot of attention. One major reason
why PUFs are seen as a promising way to generate and store cryptographic keys is that
tamper and side-channel resistant hardware is very expensive. Due to physical attacks
such as probing and reverse-engineering, it is very difficult to store a cryptographic
key in an embedded system in a secure and cost efficient way. PUFs on the other hand
are believed to be very resistant against hardware attacks as any tampering with the
PUF is believed to change the output behavior of the PUF and hence make extracting
the key difficult. Therefore, PUFs are often seen as a promising way to generate and
store cryptographic keys and there are also commercial solutions available that make
use of PUFs for key generation.
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The use of strong PUFs in challenge-and-response protocols has also gained a lot
of attention despite their weakness towards machine learning attacks. PUFs have
become a cryptographic building blocks and many protocols have been proposed
including protocols with theoretical security proofs [69]. Usually three possible ad-
vantages are listed for the use of PUFs in challenge-and-response protocols: One
argument for PUFs is that some PUFs have a lower area or power overhead compared
to cryptographic algorithms, especially if the PUFs are compared to cryptographic
algorithms that include countermeasures against hardware attacks. Secondly, the se-
cret (key) does not need to be programmed first, ensuring that every PUF instance
has a unique key even before the first power-up. This is especially useful if the PUF
is used in a piracy protection scheme. And last not least, PUFs are often believed
to be more secure against implementation attacks (physical attacks) such as probing
and side-channel attacks. Resistance against implementation attacks is an extremely
interesting property as it has been shown many times how difficult it is to protect
embedded systems against these types of attacks. A very careful design and the
combination of different countermeasures is needed to ensure a reasonable resistance
against implementation attacks. However, this increases development costs and de-
sign overhead significantly. If PUFs would indeed be very resistant towards these
implementation attacks, this would make them a very promising alternative to tra-
ditional cryptography. However, this resistance has never been thoroughly analyzed
and proven.
It has already been shown that PUFs, when used for key generation, can be
attacked with side-channel attacks by attacking the digital error-correction used in
these systems [43, 54]. These attacks do not directly attack the used PUF itself but
the digital post-processing. Nevertheless, they still indicate that using PUFs does not
necessarily solve the problem of implementation attacks as other parts of the system
might still be vulnerable. Recently, Merli et al. successfully attacked a ring-oscillator
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(RO) PUF using an EM attack that directly targeted the PUF and not the error
correction [53]. RO-PUFs only have a limited number of challenges and responses
and are therefore weak PUFs. The only side-channel attacks that directly targets a
strong PUF is the recent work by Delvaux et al. [25]. The authors used the large
unreliability of the PUF as side-channel leakage and for the first time modeled an
arbiter PUF based on this information. However, for the attack to work, the attacker
needs to know the unreliability of single response bits in the presence of thermal noise.
This means that the attack actually not only uses the reliability information but also
directly the response bit, i.e. whether a response is biased towards 1 or 0. But if the
response bits are known, traditional machine learning algorithms can be used, which
are still more efficient [25]. Hence, while the paper is interesting from a theoretical
point of view, it has only limited practical relevance.
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CHAPTER 3
SIDE-CHANNEL BASED HARDWARE WATERMARK
1 In this chapter a hardware watermark is introduced that establishes a hidden
communication channel in the target device using a side-channel. The advantage of
this type of hardware watermark is that the watermark can be inserted at the HDL
or netlist level, while the watermark can be reliably be detected if the verifier only
has physical access to the suspected IC. Most other hardware watermarks can only
detect watermarks at the same abstraction level as they were inserted. But in most
scenarios it is unlikely that a verifier has access to higher design levels such as the
netlist or the HDL code. In the following at first the two methods to implement a
side-channel based watermark are discussed followed by a robustness analysis of the
introduced side-channel based hardware watermark. At the end of this chapter the
possibility to use the hardware watermark to protect against product piracy instead
of IP theft is discussed.
3.1 Watermark Design
The main idea of the design of the side-channel hardware watermark is similar to
the side-channel based hardware Trojan introduced at CHES 2009 [50]. In [50], an
artificial side-channel is used to leak out secret information. In the side-channel based
watermark an artificial side-channel is inserted into the IP core as well. The difference
between the side-channel based hardware Trojan and the side-channel based water-
mark is that instead of leaking out secret information, the side-channel is engineered
1The research presented in this chapter was published in [11, 44] and was also presented at [12].
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to contain a watermarking signal. Two different approaches to embed a watermarking
signal into the power consumption are considered:
1. Spread spectrum based watermark
2. Input-modulated watermark
The main difference between these two approaches can be summarized as followed:
For the spread spectrum watermark a single measurement with several sample points
is used to detect the watermark. In contrast, the input-modulated watermark is
detected by evaluating several measurements acquired at an instance of time and
with different input values.
3.1.1 Spread Spectrum Based Watermark
In the spread spectrum based watermark a pseudo random number generator
(PRNG) is used to generate a watermarking sequence that is leaked out by means of
a low power binary amplitude modulation of the power consumption. The watermark
can be revealed by correlating the correct watermarking sequence with the measured
power traces. This is the same method as used in spread spectrum communication
systems (also called CDMA, code division multiple access), where the transmission
power of a signal is distributed over a wide frequency spectrum in a way that it
can still be reliably recovered even if the signal is transmitted well below the noise
floor. The same applies to our spread spectrum based watermark. The watermarking
sequence can be leaked out well below the noise floor of the used side-channel and
can still be reliably detected. This has two effects: First, the watermark is inherently
very robust to noise and second, the watermark can be hidden below the noise floor of
the power consumption and thus cannot be seen by an adversary. This hidden nature
can be considered as a kind of physical encryption. The method of hiding information
using spread spectrum has been used before in media watermarking schemes [24] and
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other applications such as military communication. For example, the military GPS
signal is encrypted and hidden in basically the same way.
3.1.1.1 Embedding the Watermark
The watermark consists of two parts: a PRNG and a leakage circuit. The PRNG
needs to produce a pseudo-random bitstream, which needs to be unpredictable to
allow hiding of the signal. Linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) with enough state
bits to prevent brute forcing the initialization vector (IV) are well suited for this task.
Nevertheless, the fact that LFSRs can easily be recovered from their known output
bitstreams has to be taken into account when designing the transmission power of
the watermark. An attacker must not be able to recover the transmitted bitstream
from the generated leakage. This assumption holds as long as the transmitted bits
are properly hidden in the noise. A way to avoid this requirement is to replace the
LFSR by a secure stream cipher using a secret key. However, although stream ciphers
can be implemented in hardware very efficiently, they increase the complexity of the
watermark design compared to simpler PRNGs.
The circuit implementing the watermark and the PRNG should be as small as
possible. This reduces the cost of the watermark while allowing to hide the design in
the surrounding circuit to defend reverse-engineering attacks. Thus the design has to
be balanced with respect to implementation size and PRNG strength.
The second part of our watermark, the leakage circuit, maps the PRNG output to
a physical power consumption. It generates additional leakage when its input is “one”
and does not generate any additional leakage when its input is “zero”. In an ASIC
design, the leakage circuit can be implemented for example using big capacitances,
toggling logic or pseudo-NMOS gates. In an FPGA implementation, circular shift
registers can be used that are clocked according to the PRNG output. Note that the
amount of generated leakage is part of the design space and can be engineered to
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Figure 3.1. Diagram of the implemented spread-spectrum based watermark
take any desired signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Although the focus in this thesis is the
power consumption side-channel, other side-channels such as EM leakage can be used
as well.
3.1.1.2 Detecting the Watermark
The embedded watermark can be detected with similar techniques as they are used
in a differential power analysis. The verifier measures a single power trace containing
several clock cycles. He then compresses this power trace to a power vector with
one value per clock cycle, e.g., by averaging all measurement points of each clock
cycle. The verifier then simulates the bit stream generated by the PRNG using his
knowledge about the implementation details. In the last detection step the verifier
correlates the simulated sequence to the compressed power vector. In case he does not
know the starting point of the PRNG, i.e., the correct position to align the simulated
sequence to the power vector, he has to slide one (the power vector) over the other
(the simulated sequence) and repeat the detection for each possible alignment. If the
watermark is embedded in the examined IC, the correlation coefficient should show
a prominent peak at the position of correct alignment. If the correlation coefficient
does not show any significant peak, then the watermark is not embedded in the
design. Using statistics to detect the watermark allows transmission with very low
SNR and provides robustness to noise. The length of the simulated sequence used




To practically evaluate our proposed watermarks we used a Side-channel Attack
Standard Evaluation-Board (SASEBO) [1] that is equipped with an xc2vp7 Virtex-II
Pro FPGA. The power consumption leakage was measured using a LeCroy WP715Zi
1.5GHz oscilloscope at a sampling rate of 250MS/s.
We implemented a 1st order DPA resistant AES implementation and tagged it
with the spread spectrum based watermark introduced above. This setup serves as our
proof of concept implementation to experimentally verify our proposed watermarking
scheme. As shown by Fig. 3.1 we used a 32-bit LFSR as the PRNG and connected
it to a leakage circuit. The leakage circuit itself was designed from 16 look-up tables
(LUTs) each configured as 16-bit circular shift registers filled with alternating ones and
zeros. These registers were clocked in all clock cycles where the output of the PRNG
is 1. In the first experiment we measured a long power trace covering 1000 clock cycles
while the AES core was idle. The power trace was then compressed by averaging over
each clock cycle and then correlated to the corresponding simulated PRNG sequence.
Calculating the correlation for a window of possible alignment positions leads to the
vector of correlation coefficients shown in Fig. 3.2(a). According to Fig. 3.2(b), using
the leakage of around 100 clock cycles would be enough to detect the existence of
the watermark in this case. In the second experiment we took a longer trace (in
comparison to the first one) while the AES implementation was constantly running
and processing different random inputs. This time the measured power trace covered
250 000 clock cycles, and the results of the watermark detection are shown in Fig. 3.3.
Clearly adapting the number of clock cycles used for correlation can overcome the
existence of the either intentional or instinctive noise and makes the detection of the
watermark feasible. An implementer of the watermark has thus two handles to design
the watermark detection properties: He can use longer sequences during detection or
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he can increase the amplitude of the generated leakage. The later one has to be used
carefully to ensure that the leakage is still hidden below the noise floor.
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Figure 3.2. Analysis of the spread spectrum based watermark while the AES core
was idle and waiting for the next plaintext (a) using the leakage of 1000 clock cycles,
(b) over the number of clock cycles
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Figure 3.3. Analysis of the spread spectrum based watermark while the AES core
was constantly encrypting (a) using the leakage of 250 000 clock cycles, (b) over the
number of clock cycles
3.1.2 Input-Modulated Watermark
The second approach to implement a watermark we propose in this paper uses the
concept of an input-modulated hardware Trojan as introduced at CHES 2009 [50]. We
call this proposal an input-modulated watermark. The idea of an input-modulated
hardware Trojan is to add additional logic to the IC that results in a power consump-
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tion which relies on the added logic, known input bits and some secret bits. This
power consumption can then be exploited using a differential power analysis to reveal
the secret bits. The main difference between the input-modulated hardware Trojan
and our watermark is that the Trojan is designed to leak out secret information while
the watermark is not supposed to leak out any unknown information but only its
presence.
Figure 3.4. Diagram of an input-modulated watermark that consists of an example
of a combination function and a leakage circuit
3.1.2.1 Embedding an Input-Modulated Watermark
As shown in Fig. 3.4, the watermark logic consists of two parts, a combination
function and a leakage circuit. The combination function uses some known input
bits to compute one output bit. This output bit is then transmitted by means of
the leakage circuit. The idea of this watermark is that we have an artificial data-
dependent power consumption that is engineered by introducing the combination
function. The owner of the watermark knows the implemented function and which
bits were used as inputs and can use this knowledge to perform a differential power
analysis. If the watermark is embedded in the IC, then this differential power analysis
will be successful, while it should not be successful if no watermark or a watermark
with a different combination function or different input bits is used.
To be able to implement this type of watermark some bits of the IP core need to
be known by the verifier and these bits need to vary for different measurements. They
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do not necessarily need to be direct inputs or outputs of the IP core but can also be
determined by internal states as long as the verifier is able to determine these bits for
a given measurement. By using internal states as “known bits” a systematic analysis
with chosen inputs can be prevented and the number of possible values used as inputs
to the combination function increases. A very easy and straightforward combination
function that was used in the proof of concept implementation of the Trojan side-
channel paper is to pairwise combine the input bits with an and conjunction and then
compute the exclusive-or sum of the outputs of all and operations.
3.1.2.2 Experimental Results
As mentioned before, the input-modulated watermark is based on the same idea
as the input-modulated side-channel hardware Trojan. In [50] practical results for a
hardware Trojan for an FPGA implementation of an AES key schedule were presented
where the input to the combination function was 8 bits of the plaintext and 8 bits
of the round key. The input-modulated watermark may use the same circuit and
changes only the inputs of the combination function. I thus omitted to present the
experiments and refer the interested reader to the experimental results already given
in [50]. For our input-modulated watermark, we would use known values for all 16
input bits of our combination function and then perform a similar correlation power
analysis. If the watermark is not embedded in the IC, then there should not be
any significant correlation between the power traces and the expected output of the
combination function.
3.1.3 Proof-Of-Ownership
The watermarks as proposed so far only allow to distinguish whether the water-
mark is embedded or not, i.e., they only provide a single bit of information. To prove
to another party that an IP core was used in a design detecting the watermark is not
sufficient, as the ownership of the watermark remains unproven. To provide proof-
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of-ownership the watermarking scheme needs to be expanded to bind a watermark
to a unique identity. This can be achieved by means of digital signatures. In a first
step the company generates the hash value of some design ID (e.g., the part number).
Then, the private key of the company is used to sign this hash value. The signature
can then be transmitted by the watermarks. To allow the proposed designs of the
watermarks to transmit information we again employ the initial concept of Trojan
side channels. That is, for the spread-spectrum watermark, storing the information to
be used for transmission in a circular shift register and XORing the MSB or LSB with
the output of the PRNG to generate a specific watermarking sequence. However, an
additional shift register of the size of the signature is needed for this solution, which
increases the size of the watermark. Another solution to bind the digital signature
to the watermark is to use parts or whole of the signature as the initial value of the
PRNG. In this case the area overhead of the additional shift register can be omitted.
An input-modulated watermark transmitting a signature can be designed by storing
the signature in internal registers and subsequently feeding it byte-wise as inputs to
the combination function in the same way the input-modulated Trojan side-channel
encodes the bytes of the secret key.
The method proposed here prevents attackers from illegally claiming ownership
of the used watermark, since the signature can only be generated by the owner of the
private key.
3.2 Watermark Robustness
In this section we discuss three intuitive approaches to remove a side-channel based
watermark: Remove or destroy the circuit implementing the watermark, increase the
noise on the side-channel, or transmit an inverse watermarking signal. The later two
attacks both aim at reducing the available SNR for detection of the watermark.
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3.2.1 Reverse-Engineering Attack
Obviously, if the circuit implementing the side-channel watermark is destroyed
or removed from the IP core, both design goals detectability and proof-of-ownership
are violated. To be able to destroy or remove the watermark an attacker first needs
to identify the corresponding part of the circuit. Note that the attacker does not
always know whether a watermark is applied to protect a circuit and what kind of
watermark is implemented. Therefore, similar to Trojan hardware, watermarks have
to be implemented very small and subtle to evade identification during reverse engi-
neering attacks. Furthermore, they should be implemented in a way to be interwoven
with the surrounding functional circuit. This can further increase the difficulty to
identify the watermark while impeding removal of the circuit without destroying the
functionality of the surrounding circuit. Especially the input-modulated watermark
can be very small, e.g., as small as around hundred gates.
The complexity of the reverse engineering attack in practice depends on the design
level at which the attacker has access to the protected circuit. If the attacker has
access only to the IP core at the post manufacturing level, detecting the watermark
will be much more difficult than detecting it in a netlist or even in RTL sources of
the design. In this case the attacker would need to first reverse engineer the hardware
design to higher abstraction levels for a feasible analysis of its functionality.
Reverse engineering an entire design is difficult, complex, and thus expensive task.
For watermarking purposes the goal of the watermark can be considered achieved if
the efforts required to illegally use an unlicensed IP core are equivalent to the efforts
necessary to reverse engineer a circuit to the level of fully understanding the design.
3.2.2 Raising the Noise
How easy a verifier is able to detect a watermark depends on the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) of the watermarking signal. The lower the SNR, the more (or the longer)
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measurements are needed to detect the watermark. Increasing the noise of the side-
channel will thus reduce the SNR and therefore impedes detection. However, adding
additional noise sources results in an increase of power consumption and is thus
limited by practical constraints such as battery lifetimes.
Both watermarks are very robust to this kind of attacks. To detect a spread-
spectrum watermark a verifier can lower the effect of the noise by averaging over
multiple measurements or by increasing the number of clock cycles covered by the
measured trace. For an input-modulated watermark the amount of acquired power
traces used during detection is also only limited by the time required to perform the
additional measurements. Since the size of the leakage circuit is a design choice of
the designer, the SNR and hence the robustness to noise is part of the design space.
3.2.3 Transmission of an Inverse Watermark Signal
The idea of our third attack scenario is to hide the signal of the watermark by
adding another leakage source that generates leakage in all clock cycles where the
watermark itself does not generate any leakage. The idea of this attack is that
this inverse signal counterbalances the original watermarking signal and results in a
constant power consumption for both signals. We call this introduction of an inverse
watermark signal. In theory this makes the detection of the watermarking signal
impossible. We will now show that this attack can not be put into practice.
The signals of the side-channel hardware watermarks are hidden well below the
noise floor and unknown to an attacker. Without the knowledge of the details of the
used PRNG and its initial vector (for a spread spectrum based watermark) or the
used combination function and input bits (for an input-modulated watermark) an
attacker can not even compose the inverse signal. Additionally the attacker would
need to know the design of the leakage generating circuit to achieve the correct
amplitude for the inverse signal. We now consider that the attacker has full access
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to the details of the used watermark (which is not always likely) and is able to
implement an inverse copy of the watermarking circuit. This can still not avoid
detection of the watermarking signal. Process variations during manufacturing as
well as slight changes in internal capacitances will result in subtle differences in the
power consumptions of the watermark and the inverse watermark. Also very small
delays of the clock signal result in inaccurate alignments of the two signals. This
makes detection of the proposed watermarking signals possible in practice even with
the presence of an inverted watermarking signal.
To experimentally demonstrate this we implemented the inverse-signal transmis-
sion attack in our FPGA implementation of the spread spectrum based watermark.
We added an exact copy of the watermarking circuit to our design that consists of the
same leakage circuit and the same PRNG with the only exception that the output of
the PRNG is inverted. The results of this attack can be seen in Fig. 3.5.
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Figure 3.5. Detection of a spread spectrum based watermark that was counter-
balanced by an inverse watermarking signal. We performed the same analysis as
described in 3.1.1.2 while the AES core was idle (a) using the leakage of 10 000 clock
cycles, (b) over the number of clock cycles.
We have tested this configuration when the AES core was idle. It turned out
that the watermark was still clearly visible with as few as 10 000 clock cycles. The
correlation coefficient decreased and thus the attack led to a 10 fold increase of the
required number of covered clock cycles. However, although both, the watermarking
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circuit and the inverse one, use equal building blocks of the FPGA, detecting the
watermark is still possible because the power consumption of the two circuits are not
exactly inverse due to the different routing of both parts. In practice this attack is
equivalent to reducing the SNR of the watermark and cannot prevent detection of
the watermark due to the arguments given in the previous section.
3.3 Counterfeit Protection
So far we have discussed how the side-channel watermark can be used to detect
if a IP-core has been illegitimately used in an IC. But another large concern in the
IT industry is counterfeiting of products. Here we can distinguish between two types
of counterfeits: Counterfeits that are actually completely different designs (but pos-
sibly with the same functionality) but that are falsely labeled. And counterfeits that
are direct copies of the legitimate chip, either by stealing the design details (e.g. by
reverse-engineering or mask theft), by illegal overproduction of the chip by the man-
ufacturer, or because a chip that was labeled for low performance use only is illegally
relabeled for high performance.
In the case of counterfeits that are different designs, e.g., chips from a different
manufacturer that are relabeled, can easily be identified with the side-channel water-
mark without any alterations. If the watermark is not detected in the chip, the chip
under test is a counterfeit. The reason for this is that the watermarks are transmitted
below the noise level and without knowing the watermark secret the watermarks can
neither be detected nor cloned. Hence, these counterfeits will not have the correct
watermark embedded and can therefore be detected.
However, if the product theft is done by copying the design or by relabeling a
low performance chip this can not be detected without modifications to the hardware
watermark. The very idea of the watermark is that it cannot be easily removed from
a design. Hence, each copy will inevitably also have the side-channel watermark em-
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bedded. To be able to protect against these types of product piracy the watermark
design needs to be altered. Instead of transmitting a fixed watermark signal, the
watermark design is altered to transmit a signature in a programmable part of the
design. This programmable part is programmed in a step after manufacturing. For
example, programmable read-only memory (PROM) based on fuses can be used to
store this watermark secret. As the signature is programmed post-manufacturing, it
can be generated over a device specific serial number in addition to the part number,
so that each device contains a unique watermark. This way only devices programmed
by the circuit designer include the correct signature and mere cloning of the semi-
conductor is not sufficient to build indistinguishable copies of a design. Since the
signature is programmable, devices that are marked for low performance or non-
commercial applications etc. can have a different signature and can therefore also
be reliably detected. Previously proposed hardware watermarking schemes that are
not based on side-channels cannot protect against cloning as the watermark cannot
be programmed after manufacturing [42, 60, 61, 76]. In summary, a semiconductor
device should include two watermarks: One that is programmed after manufacturing
to protect against piracy and cloning and one that is implemented fully in hardware
to detect IP theft.
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CHAPTER 4
SIDE-CHANNEL BASED SOFTWARE WATERMARK
1 The idea behind side-channel based software watermarks is very similar to side-
channel based hardware watermark. As a matter of fact, the side-channel software
watermark can be seen as an adoption of the hardware watermarking techniques
towards software for embedded systems. Detecting software plagiarism in embedded
systems can be very challenging. In comparison to software for PC-applications the
program code is often not directly accessible. Most embedded microcontrollers have
a program memory read protection that prevents third parities to easily access it.
Other internal memory such as RAM is usually protected as well and cannot be
easily read out. This together with the fact that most programs are written in low
level languages such as C or assembly make most software watermarks proposed in
the literature not applicable for embedded software. The side-channel based software
watermark proposed in this thesis overcomes these restriction. The watermark signal
is hidden in the power consumption of the embedded microcontroller. Hence, no
access to any kind of memory is needed to detect the watermark. Furthermore, the
watermark can be implemented in assembly and only introduces a small overhead in
terms of size and runtime, making it an attractive fit for embedded microcontrollers.
Furthermore, using the EM side-channel enables a n easy and contact-less way to
detect the watermark.
1The research presented in this chapter was published in [10] and [15].
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The basic structure of the side-channel software watermark is the same as the
input-modulated watermark from Chapter 3. The watermark consists of three com-
ponents:
• internal state and watermark constant
• combination function
• leakage function
and is realized by adding instructions at the assembly level to the targeted code.
Figure 4.1 shows an example of a side-channel software watermark. The combination
function uses some known internal state of the program and a watermark constant
to compute a one-bit output. This output bit is then leaked (transmitted) via the
power consumption using a leakage function. The leakage function is realized by one
or several instructions whose power dissipation depends on the value of the combi-
nation function. This results in a power consumption that depends on the known
internal state, the combination function and the watermark constant. To detect the
watermark, the verifier can use his knowledge of the watermark design to perform a
correlation power analysis (CPA). If this power analysis is successful, i.e., the water-
mark signal is detected in the power traces, the verifier can be sure that his watermark
is embedded in the device. In many applications this will imply that a copy of the
original software is present.
In the following, we will first describe the details of my proof-of-concept implemen-
tation before I explain how this watermark can be detected by means of a side-channel
analysis.
4.1 Software Watermark Design
To show the feasibility of this approach, a side-channel watermark was imple-






Figure 4.1. Example of a side-channel based software watermark that was inserted
into the key expansion of an AES algorithm. The combination function as well as
the leakage function is realized by adding a few additional assembly instructions into
the code. The internal state needs to be a changing in a predictable way. In this
watermark the first two bytes of the plaintext were used as the internal state. The
watermark constant is a fixed value that can be chosen by the watermark owner and
forms together with the internal state the input to the combination function.
tollers are similar and in the following only the results for the Atmega8 are discussed
in detail. The interested reader can find the results for the PIC 16F687 in [10].
4.1.1 Implementation
The side-channel based watermark consists of a combination function and a leak-
age function. In the example implementation the input to the combination function
is a 16-bit internal state and a 16-bit watermark constant. The combination function
computes a one-bit output which is leaked out using a leakage function. There are
many ways to implement a combination function, and the function introduced here
should only be seen as an example. A very small and compact combination function
was chosen that only consists of four assembly instructions. The 16-bit input to the
combination function is separated into two byte values in1 and in2. In the first step,
in1 and in2 are each subtracted from the one-byte watermark constants, c1 and c2. In
the next step the two one-byte results of these subtractions are multiplied with each
other. The resulting two byte product r from this multiplication is again separated
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into two one-byte values r0 and r1. These two values are then multiplied with each
other again.
r = (in1 − c1) · (in2 − c2) = r0||r1
res = r0 · r1
The output of the combination function is the 8th least significant bit of the result
res of this multiplication. The corresponding assembly code can be found below.
subi in1,35 ;subtracts constant from in1
subi in2,202 ;subtracts constant from in2
mul in1,in2 ;multiplies in1 and in2 and
;stores the result in R0 and R1
mul R0,R1 ;multiplies R0 and R1
The registers in1 and in2 are used as the internal states and the integers 35 and 202
are the two watermark constants c1 and c2. The instruction subi in1,35 subtracts
the constant 35 from in1 and stores the result back in in1. In the ATmega8 instruction
set the two-byte result of the multiply instruction mul is always stored in R0 and R1.
The result of the combination function is the most significant bit in R0.
A leakage function is used to leak the output bit of the combination function.
In this implementation a conditional jump is used as the leakage function. If the
output bit of the combination function is 0, the two’s complement of the register
R0 is computed, otherwise no operation is executed. Furthermore, the result of R0
is stored in the memory. Below is the corresponding assembly code for the leakage
function:
SBRC R0,7 ;skip next instruction if
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;bit 7 in register R0 is 0
neg R0 ;compute 2’s complement of R0
st Z,R0 ;store R0 in the RAM
Recall that the output of the combination function is the most significant bit of R0.
SBRC R0,7 checks the most significant bit of R0 and skips the next instruction if
this bit is 0. Otherwise the neg instruction is executed, which computes the two’s
complement of R0. In the last step, the value of R0 is stored in the memory.
The leakage function helps the verifier to detect the watermark. The difference in
the power consumption between the case that the neg instruction is executed and the
case that instead a nop is executued is very big. This makes detecting the watermark
using side-channel analysis straightforward.
I was also able to successfully detect the watermark without any leakage function.
This is due to the fact that the power consumption of the last multiply instruction
is higher if the output bit is 1 compared to 0. However, the leakage function makes
detection much easier and can also protect against reverse-engineering and code-
transformation attacks (see Section 4.2). The next subsection will provide more
details on how the watermark detection works.
4.1.2 Watermark Verification
To detect the watermark a correlation power analysis (CPA) as introduced in
Section 2.1.2 is used. The main idea of a correlation power analysis is to exploit
the fact that the power consumption of a device depends on the executed algorithm
as well as on the processed data. A lot of traces are measured in a CPA and then
statistical methods are used to extract the wanted information. In a classical CPA
setting the goal is to retrieve a secret key. In the watermark case, the verifier does
not want to retrieve a secret key but wants to verify whether or not his watermark
is present. To do this, the verifier first collects power traces with different inputs of
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the system under test. For each trace the verifier computes the known internal state
that is used as the input to the combination function (in my implementation this was
the value of register in1 and in2). The internal state used for the watermark should
be a varying state that is predictable for the verifier, e.g., a state depending on the
input or output. The verifier uses this internal state and the watermark constants to
compute the output of the used combination function for each input value and stores
these values as the correct hypothesis. He repeats this procedure n−1 times by using
different watermark constants or combination functions. At the end the verifier has n
hypotheses with n different watermark constants or combination functions, where one
of the hypotheses contains the correct watermark constant and combination function.
In the last step the verifier correlates the hypotheses with the measured power
traces. If the watermark is embedded in the tested device, a correlation peak should
be visible for the hypothesis with the correct watermark constant. This is due to
the fact that the correct hypothesis is the best prediction of the power consumption
during the execution of the leakage function. The result of the CPA on the example
implementation can be found in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. In Figure 4.3 we can see
that detecting the watermark is possible with less than 100 measurements.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.2. The result of the side-channel analysis plotted (a) against time and (b)
with respect to different hypotheses, where hypothesis number 100 is the correct one.
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Figure 4.3. The results of the side-channel analysis with respect to number of
measurements. Even with less than hundred measurements the correct hypothesis
can be clearly detected.
Other microcontrollers will have a different power behavior and therefore the num-
ber of traces needed to detect the watermark might vary from CPU to CPU. It should
be noted that a few hundred traces are easily obtained from most practical embedded
systems, and it is reasonable to assume that a verifier can use much more measure-
ments if needed. Hence, even if the signal-to-noise ratio might decrease for other
microcontrollers, it is safe to assume that detection of this kind of watermark will in
most cases be possible. It should also be noted that the length of the code that is
being watermarked does not have an impact on the signal-to-noise ratio of the de-
tection. The number of instructions that are executed before or after the watermark
does not make any difference in this type of side-channel analysis.
4.1.3 Triggering
One important aspect of the software watermark detection is the triggering and
alignment of the the power measurements. To take a power measurement, a trigger
signal is needed that will indicate the oscilloscope when to start the measurement. In
practice, a communication signal or the power-up signal is often used as the trigger
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signal. Other possible trigger points might be an unusual low or high power consump-
tion, e.g., when data is written to a non-volatile memory position, the microcontroller
wakes up from a sleep mode or a coprocessor is activated. Modern oscilloscopes have
advanced triggering mechanisms where several trigger conditions can be used at once,
e.g., a specific signal from the bus followed by an unusual high power consumption.
Because these trigger points might not be close to the inserted watermark, the verifier
might need to locate and align the watermark in a large power trace. Note that the
designer is free to insert the watermark near a point which can serve as a convenient
trigger. With some knowledge of the underlying design, it is usually possible to guess
a time window in which the watermarked code is executed. Looking for power pat-
terns that, e.g., are caused by a large number of memory look-ups or the activation
of a coprocessor can also help to identify the time window where the watermark is
executed. Once this time window is located, alignment mechanisms such as simple
pattern matching algorithms [51] or more advanced methods such as [59, 77] are used
to align each power trace with each other.
The problem of triggering and alignment of the power trace for a side-channel
watermark is similar to the problem of triggering and alignment of the power traces
in a real-world side-channel attack. Often in a real-world side-channel analysis the
attacker has actually less knowledge of the attacked system than the verifier has for
detecting the watermark. The verifier knows the code and flow of his watermarked
program while in a real-world attack the attacker can often only guess how it is
implemented. I would therefore like to refer to the area of real-world side-channel
attacks for more details on the feasibility of triggering a measurement in practice
[26, 55, 56, 63]. The alignment of power traces will be addressed in more detail in
Section 4.2.2 when I describe how to overcome the insertion of random delays as one
of the possible attacks on the side-channel watermark.
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4.2 Robustness and Security Analysis of the Software Wa-
termark
In the previous section I have introduced the software side-channel watermarks
and showed that they can be reliably detected. However, so far the security of the
watermark has not been discussed. Traditionally, the security of watermarks towards
different attacks is called robustness. No software watermark has been proposed
yet that is completely robust and that can withstand all known attacks [34]. For
software watermarks, and especially side-channel watermarks, it is very difficult to
quantify the robustness of the watermark. We do not claim that the watermark is
“completely robust” or secure — given sufficient effort the side-channel based software
watermark can be removed. In the following, the security model is introduced and
some possible attacks against the system are described. We will provide arguments
why these attacks can be non-trivial in practice. Hence, the watermark—although
not impossible to remove — still represents a significant obstacle for an attacker.
In the security model of the software watermark three parties are involved: The
owner of the watermark who inserted the watermark, the verifier who locates the
watermark in a suspected device and an attacker who tries to remove the watermark
from a software code. The attacker has only access to the assembly code of the
watermarked program. The attacker does not know the design of the combination
function as well as what part of the assembly code implements this combination
function and which internal states or constants are being used in this combination
function. This knowledge is considered the watermark secret. The verifier needs
to be a trusted third party who shares the watermark secret with the owner of the
watermark. A successful attack is defined as follows:
“A transformation of the watermarked software code that (1) will make it impos-
sible for the verifier to locate the watermark with means of side-channel analysis and
(2) does not change the functionality of the software program”.
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Hence, an attacker was unsuccessful if either the verifier is still able to detect
the software watermark or the resulting software code does not fulfill the intended
purpose of the program any longer. I will discuss three different attack approaches
to remove the watermark from the assembly code:
Reverse-engineering attack: In a reverse-engineering attack the attacker tries
to locate the assembly instructions that implement the watermark using reverse-
engineering techniques so that he can remove or alter these instructions.
Code-transformation attacks: In a code-transformation attack, the attacker
uses automated code-transformations to change the original assembly code in a way
that the resulting code is still functioning correct but the watermark detection is
impossible.
Side-channel attacks: In a side-channel attack the attacker tries to use side-
channel techniques to locate the side-channel signal in the power consumption. This
gives the attacker the knowledge of the location of some of the watermark instructions
(e.g., the leakage function).
In the following, each of the three attacks is discussed in more detail.
4.2.1 Reverse-Engineering Attack
If the attacker can reverse-engineer the entire code and identify the purpose of each
instruction and function, the attacker also knows which instructions are not directly
needed by the program and which are therefore possible watermark instructions.
However, complete reverse-engineering of the assembly code can be very difficult
and time consuming, especially in larger programs. Furthermore, complete reverse-
engineering might be more expensive than actually implementing it, making product
piracy not cost effective if reverse-engineering is needed. An attacker can try to locate
the watermark without reverse-engineering the entire code. For example, the attacker
could use techniques such as data-flow diagrams to detect suspicious code segments
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which he can then investigate further. The complexity of such attacks depends on
the attackers reverse-engineer skills as well as on the way the watermark is embedded
in the code.
I believe that due to the small size of the watermarks, locating the watermarks
with methods of reverse-engineering can be very expensive for the attacker. Especially
in larger designs, which are usually more attractive for software theft, this can be very
difficult. Another attractive property of the side-channel watermarks is that they are
hidden in the power consumption of the system. This means that an attacker cannot
tell whether or not a watermark is present in the code. So even if she locates and
removes one or several side-channel watermarks from a code, she cannot be sure if
there are not still more watermarks present in the code. Considering the small size
of only 5-10 assembly instructions for some watermarks, adding multiple watermarks
is still very economical. This may discourage attackers from stealing the code as
reverse-engineering the entire code is necessary to ensure that all watermarks have
been removed.
4.2.2 Code-Transformation Attacks
In an automated code-transformation attack, a software is used to change the
program code without changing the semantically correct execution of the program.
Examples for code-transformations are recompiling the code, reordering of instruc-
tions and obfuscation techniques such as replacing one instruction with one or more
instructions that have the same result. Code-transformations can be a very powerful
attack tool for disabling software watermarks as has been shown in [34], where all
tested static software watermarks for Java bytecodes have been successfully removed
with standard obfuscation tools.
Let us first consider the impact of reordering of instructions and the insertion of
dummy instructions on the side-channel watermark. If these methods are used by the
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attacker, they can have the effect that the leakage function is executed in a different
clock cycle compared to the original code. For the detection this means that the
correlation peak will be at a different clock cycle. However, the correlation peak will
be as visible as without the reordering as inserting a static delay does not decrease
the signal-to-noise ratio. Therefore, simple reordering and the insertion of dummy
instructions cannot prevent the verifier from detecting the watermark.
However, if the attacker does not add a static but a random delay this will have a
negative impact on the watermark detection. Random delays have the effect that the
measurement traces are not aligned with each other, i.e., the clock cycle where the
leakage function is executed varies from measurement to measurement. Unaligned
traces hamper side-channel analysis but the detection can still be successful if enough
traces are aligned with each other [51]. It is not always easy to insert efficient random
delays into the code, e.g., a source of randomness is needed and simply measuring the
execution time of a program might give indication of the random delay introduced.
Furthermore, the verifier can use alignment methods to detect such misalignment and
remove the random delays. By using these alignment methods the verifier has a good
chance to counteract the random delays, especially if the delays are inserted several
clock cycles before the leakage function. Due to the fact that the attacker does not
know the location of the leakage function this is very likely. Otherwise the attacker
would need to insert a lot of random delays which will hurt the performance.
To show the power of alignment techniques to counteract random delays I changed
the experiment by inserting random delays. In my first approach I added my own
random delays by using a timer interrupt that would pseudo-randomly trigger every
1-128 clock cycles. I used an S-Box to generate the pseudo-random numbers and an
externally generated 8-bit random number as its initialization for each measurement.
These random interrupts did not provide much of an obstacle and with a simple
pattern matching algorithm [51] I was able to detect the watermark. The result
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of the CPA is shown in Figure 4.4(a). To make the experiment more credible I
also implemented the random delay based side-channel countermeasure presented at
[22] into the watermarked AES. This countermeasure, called improved floating mean,
inserts random delays at fixed positions but with a varying length. The initial state
of the used PRNG is an externally generated 64-bit number2. I again used a pattern-
matching alignment algorithm and peak extraction before performing a CPA. The
result of this analysis is shown in Figure 4.4(b). The correlation coefficient decreased
for this analysis compared to the original watermarked AES implementation from
around 0.85 to 0.5 but this correlation value is still very large. These results aim to
show that it is not simple to insert random delays to defeat the watermark detection.
With more improved alignment methods (e.g. [59, 77]) better results could probably
be achieved. Furthermore, Strobel et al. [75] demonstrated how to efficently remove
random delays from power traces.
By replacing instructions, an attacker might change the power profile of a code.
For example, instead of using the decrement instruction DEC to decrease a register
value, the subtract with constant instruction SUBI could be used. These instructions
have a different power profile. However, even if the attacker can change the power
profile of the code significantly, this does not impact the CPA. The power consump-
tion of the clock cycles before or after the watermark do not have impact on the
CPA correlation. As long as there is a difference in power consumption according
to the output of the combination function this difference can be used to detect the
watermark using a CPA. For example, just the transmission of the output of the com-
bination function over the internal bus usually leaks enough data-dependent power
2I used the parameters provided in [22] for my implementation of improved floating mean with
three dummy rounds before the encryption and inserted the watermark in the main AES encryption
function. 29 random delays, each varying between 24-536 clock cycles in steps of two, are executed
before the first execution of the watermark.
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Figure 4.4. Figure showing a CPA with 1,000 measurements to detect the watermark
in two implementations with random-delay countermeasures. In both figures peak
extraction and a pattern based alignment method were used. In (a) random delays
are introduced by pseudo-randomly triggering a timer interrupt every 1-128 clock
cycles. In (b) the side-channel countermeasure improved floating mean was added to
the watermarked AES. In both cases the watermark is clearly detectable.
consumption to be used in a side-channel analysis, regardless of the actual instruction
that is being executed.3
A code-transformation that removes the output of the combination function on the
other hand would be successful. But every code-transformation algorithm needs to
make sure that the resulting code does not change the semantically correct execution
of the program. Therefore, it needs to be ensured that for the compiler or code-
transformation algorithm the watermark value is considered needed. This can be
done by storing the output or using it in some other way. In this case any code-
transformations attacks will be unsuccessful as removing the watermark value would
destroy the semantical correct execution of the program from the view of a compiler.
Adding additional side-channel watermarks to a program can be seen as a code-
transformation as well. A side-channel watermark should not change the state of the
3This assumes that the power consumption of the internal bus is correlated with the Hamming
weight of the transmitted bits, which is usually the case for microcontrollers[51].
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program that is being watermarked to ensure that the watermark does not cause soft-
ware failures. Hence, additional watermarks will not change the combination function
of a previously inserted watermark. They might only introduce some either static or
data-dependent delays. For this reason, it is possible to add multiple watermarks into
a design without interference problems.
4.2.3 Side-Channel Attacks
If the attacker can successfully detect the watermark using a side-channel analy-
sis, the attacker also gains the knowledge of the exact clock cycles where watermark
instructions (e.g., the leakage functions) are executed. In this case the attacker only
needs to remove or alter these instructions to make the watermark detection impos-
sible. Therefore, the watermark should only be detectable by the legitimate verifier
who possesses the watermark secret.
The attacker can try to discover the watermark secret by performing a brute-
force side-channel analysis in which he tries every possible watermark secret. But
the attacker faces two problems with this approach: the big search space of possible
watermarks and false positives. The size of the search space of possible watermark
secrets depends strongly on the application, the size of the watermark, and the archi-
tecture of the microcontroller. The application that is being watermarked determines
how many internal states can be used as inputs to the combination function and the
size of the watermark determines how many operations the combination function per-
forms. Finally, the number of available instructions and functions that can be used
for the watermark also influences the search space.
In the following, I give a rough estimation of a possible search space for the
example application of an AES-128 encryption on the 8-bit ATmega8 microcontroller.
The AES encryption program has two 16-byte inputs, the plaintext and the key, and
one 16-byte output, the ciphertext. Let us assume that the designer of the watermark
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can use the 16-byte input for his internal state of the watermark. For simplicity I
assume that the combination function consists of 10 basic instructions using the
internal states and two 8-bit watermark constants as inputs. Furthermore I assume
that only the six ATmega8 instructions addition, subtraction, AND, OR, exclusive-
OR, and multiplication can be used. Using these parameters the lower bound of
possible different combination functions is roughly 275.
Besides the large search space an attacker has also to face the problem of false
positives. If an attacker tries 275 different watermark secrets it is likely that the
attacker will see some correlation peaks that are not due to the actual watermark. One
reason for a correlation peak might simply be noise as statistically some hypotheses
will generate greater correlation peaks than others. Such peaks are called ghost peaks
in the literature. These correlation peaks should be smaller than the actual correlation
peak due to the watermark if enough traces are used. However, if the attacker has
not discovered the watermark yet he does not know how high the correlation peak of
the watermark is supposed to be and might therefore falsely suspect wrong parts of
the design to be the watermark. The second reason why a false positive might appear
is that some part of the actual program that is being watermarked might be linearly
related to a possible watermark. In a brute-force approach all possible operations on
the internal states are tested. Therefore, it is more than likely that one or several
of the tested combination functions are identical or linearly related to parts of the
actual program. In this case, correlation peaks appear that will indicate a possible
watermark at a location where there is no watermark embedded.
To summarize, detecting the watermark using side-channel analysis can be quite
complicated for the attacker. Using small (and possible multiple) watermarks will
increase the problem of false positives while the search space becomes too big in
practice if larger watermark secrets (more operations and/or more possible internal
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states) are used. In my opinion, it seems that using a reverse-engineering or code-
transformation approach is more promising to remove the watermark in practice.
4.3 Proof-of-Ownership
The watermark discussed in the previous section only transmits one bit of in-
formation: either the watermark is present or not. This is very helpful to detect
whether or not your code was used in an embedded system. However, it is not pos-
sible for the verifier to prove towards a third party that he is the legitimate owner
of the watermark. This is due to the fact that the watermark itself does not contain
any information about the party who inserted the watermark. Therefore, everyone
could claim to be the owner of the watermark once he detects a watermark in a sys-
tem. In this section, I will show how we can expand the watermark idea to provide
proof-of-ownership as well.
The idea to establish proof-of-ownership is to modify the side-channel watermark
in a way that the watermark transmits a digital signature that can uniquely identify
the owner of the watermark. This approach is similar to the proof-of-ownership
concept for hardware watermarks in Section 3.1.3. One attractive property of the
side-channel watermark is that the watermark is hidden in the noise of the power
consumption of the system. Without the knowledge of the watermark secret, the
presence of the watermark cannot be detected. So we have already established a
hidden communication channel. In Figure 4.2(a) we can observe a positive correlation
peak while the leakage circuit is being executed. Recall that the leakage circuit is
designed in such a way that the power consumption is higher when the output of the
combination function is ‘1’. If we change the leakage function in a way that the power
consumption is higher when the output bit is ‘0’ instead of ‘1’, then the correlation will
be inverted. That means that we would not see a positive, but a negative correlation
peak. We can use this property to transmit information. If the bit we want to
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transmit is ‘0’, we invert the output bit of the combination function. If it is ‘1’, we
do not invert the output bit. By doing so, we know that ‘1’ is being transmitted
when we see a positive correlation peak and ‘0’ when we see a negative correlation
peak. We can use this method to transmit data one bit at a time. I tested this
kind of watermark by using the same combination function as discussed in Section 4
but exchanged the leakage function. I stored an 80-bit signature that I wanted to
transmit with my watermark in the program memory. I then load the signature, one
byte at a time, from the program memory and subsequently add the output bit of
the combination function to the bit we want to transmit. The resulting bit is then
leaked out using a conditional jump, just as it has been done in Section 4.1.1.
The same detection method as explained in Section 4.1.2 is used to detect the
watermark and to read out the transmitted signature. Figure 4.5 shows the result of
this correlation based power analysis. The positive and negative correlation peaks over
time represent the transmitted signature. The resulting watermark is still quite small.
In the example implementation the watermark consists of only 15 assembly instruction
for the leakage function and only 4 instructions for the combination function. I also
used 80 bits of the program memory to store the digital signature. If storing the
signature in the program memory is too suspicious, it is also possible to implement the
leakage function without a load instruction by using constants. This might increase
the code-size a bit, but it is still possible to program the leakage function with around
30 instructions for a 80 bit signature on an 8-bit microcontroller. In a 16-bit or 32-bit
architecture, smaller code sizes can be achieved.
4.4 Detecting Software Theft Without a Watermark
The introduced side-channel based software watermark can be used to reliably
detect software theft in embedded systems. The lightweight nature of the watermark
makes it easy and economical to insert such watermarks. However, what if no water-
59
Figure 4.5. Side-channel watermark that transmits an ID. Positive correlation peaks
indicate that a ‘1’ is being transmitted, negative correlation peaks indicate a ‘0’. In
this Figure we can see how the hexadecimal string “E926CFFD” is being transmitted.
mark has been added to the design before a suspected software theft? Even in this
case it is still possible to detected software theft in embedded systems using power
side-channels [15]4. At the example of the Atmega 8 microcontroller it was shown
that it is possible to determine the Hamming weight of the executed machine code
from the power consumption of the device. This enables a verifier to compare his
software code with the code run on a device without having access to the program
memory. To test if your software is running on the device, a verifier collects the power
consumption of the device under tests and reads out the Hamming weight of the ex-
ecuted instructions. The verifier can then compare this Hamming weight string with
the corresponding Hamming weights of his software code. However, the measure-
ments can be faulty so that some Hamming weights might be wrong and interrupts
and conditional branches can change the execution flow of the software. Hence, it
4I would like to note that my co-author Daehyun Strobel deserves the credit for this technique
and it was only included in this thesis for sake of completeness.
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is likely that the two strings will not match completely, even if the same software is
used. Dot-plots can be used to overcome this weakness and detect the software theft
in the presence of interrupts and branches. For details on this technique I would like
to refer to [15]. The disadvantage of this technique is that it is not as robust against
code-transformations as the watermark solution and that it only works with micro-
controllers that directly leak out the Hamming weight of the executed instructions.
The software watermark on the other hand is much more robust to noise due to its
differential nature and does not rely on such a fine-grain power model.
Hence, the side-channel based software watermark is more reliable in detecting
software theft. But if no watermark is available, the technique presented in [15]
based on string-matches can be a promising alternative for detecting software thefts.
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CHAPTER 5
SIDE-CHANNEL BASED HARDWARE TROJANS
1 The previous chapters showed how intentional side-channels can be used to build
efficient watermarks for protecting software and hardware designs. However, inten-
tional side-channels can also be used maliciously. This chapter discusses one possible
malicious application of intentional side-channels: hardware Trojans. Hardware Tro-
jans are malicious modifications to a hardware design that alter the functionality or
reliability of a design or leak out secret information. Hardware Trojans can be acti-
vated with a specific event, such as a specific input sequence, or at a specific time.
But some hardware Trojans can also be active all the time. A good hardware Trojan
should remain undetected at least until it has performed the intended action. Oth-
erwise the Trojan-infected hardware will be discarded before the attacker has gained
any advantage.
The hidden nature of intentional side-channels make them an attractive tool to
build hardware Trojans: Intentional side-channels are well hidden in the noise and
can only be recovered by their implementer. Furthermore, intentional side-channels
can be built with only a few gates and are hard to detect using reverse-engineering.
In the following a novel way to build layout level hardware Trojans is introduced.
These so-called dopant Trojans are realized without adding any additional transis-
tors. Instead, only existing gates are modified below the polysilicon level, making
them difficult to detect. The “usefulness” of these Trojans are demonstrated in Sec-
tion 5.1.2 where it is demonstrated how the security of an otherwise secure random
1The research presented in this chapter was published in [14].
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number generator (RNG) is compromised by inserting this Trojan into the digital
post-processing of this RNG. In Section 5.2 I then demonstrate that the same tech-
nique can be used to efficiently establish a Trojan side-channel to leak out the secret
key of an otherwise side-channel resistant encryption algorithm. The side-channel is
realized without adding a single transistor and has zero overhead in terms of area.
In Section 5.3 results of side-channel based hardware Trojans that are inserted at
the gate level as opposed to the layout level are summarized. Interestingly, the use
of side-channels in regards to hardware Trojans are not restricted to transmit infor-
mation from within a IC to the outside. Intentional side-channels can also be used
to activate a Trojan by transmitting a trigger signal over a side-channel towards the
Trojan circuitry. These active side-channel Trojans are discussed in Section 5.3.2.
5.1 Dopant Trojans
In this section we focus on Trojans which are inserted by modifying the layout of a
design. Focusing on the layout level represents a major difference to most other work
in the hardware Trojan research. This work helps to shed light on the question of how
hard or easy it is for a foundry to insert a Trojan if they do not have access to higher
abstraction levels than the mask. Furthermore, by focusing on the layout level we
can set a new lower boundary of how much overhead can be expected by a hardware
Trojan in practice. Such information is essential for research and work in the Trojan
detection area. As it turns out, an intentional side-channel can be introduced into a
design without even adding a single transistor. The intentional side-channel is created
by only modifying the layout masks below the polysilicon level without touching the
polysilicon level or any metal layer. This reduces the overhead of the Trojan in terms
of gate-count and area to zero. This new type of Trojan, called dopant Trojan, is also
close to invisible to optical inspection, making it extremely difficult to detect.
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5.1.1 Design of Dopant Trojans
In this section an efficient way to design hardware Trojans without changing any
metal or ploysilicon layer of the target design is introduced. The main idea of the
proposed Trojan is teh following: A gate of the original design is modified by ap-
plying a different dopant polarity to specific parts of the gate’s active area. These
modifications change the behavior of the target gate in a predictable way and are
very similar to the technique used for code-obfuscation in some commercial designs
[40]. In the following I will explain the dopant modification method at the example
of a simple inverter. In this example the inverter is modified in a way that it always
outputs VDD regarles of its input. I would like to note that the proposed techniques
are sufficiently general to be applied to other types of gates in a similar way.
An inverter consists of a pmos and an nmos transistor whose drain contacts are
connected via a metal layer as shown in Figure 5.1(a). In the upper part of Fig-
ure 5.1(a) shows a pmos transistor which consists of an nwell and a polysilicon wire
separating the positively doped source and drain region within the active area. To
create an inverter Trojan that constantly outputs VDD, the positively doped p-dopant
mask of this pmos transistor is exchanged with the negatively doped n-dopant mask.
Doping an active area within an n-well with n-dopant basically creates a connection
to the n-well. N-wells are usually always connected to VDD in a CMOS design. Since
the n-dopant is applied to the entire active area of the pmos transistor, including the
metal contacts, a direct connection from these contacts to the n-well is created. The
upper part of Figure 5.1(b) shows the resulting pmos transistor Trojan. The source
contact, which is connected to VDD, has been transformed into an n-well tap, creating
an additional connection from the n-well to VDD. The drain contact is also connected
to the n-well and thereby to VDD. Hence, we have created a constant connection
between VDD and the drain contact without modifying the metal, polysilicon, n-well
or active area.
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(a) Original (b) Trojan
Figure 5.1. An unmodified inverter gate (a) and a Trojan inverter gate with a
constant output of VDD (b).
In the second step the connection between the nmos transistor’s drain contact
and GND is constantly disabled. This is achieved by applying p-dopant to the source
contact of the nmos transistor while leaving the drain contact untouched. Applying
p-dopant to the source contact of the nmos transistor transforms it into a well tap
again and cuts of any connection between the source contact and the negatively
doped source area of the nmos transistor. Therefore, the nmos transistor is no longer
connected to GND regardless of its gate input. The resulting Trojan inverter can
be seen in Figure 5.1(b). The metal, ploysilicon, active and well layers are identical
with the original inverter in Figure 5.1(a), but the Trojan gate always outputs VDD
regardless of its input. Note that by simply switching the roles of the nmos and
pmos transistors the inverter can also easily be modified to constantly output GND
regardless of its input.
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Besides fixing the output of transistors to specific values, it is also possible to
change the strength of transistors in a similar way. The strength of a transistor in
CMOS is defined by its width. Usually the entire active area of a transistor is doped
and therefore the width of a transistor is defined by the active area. However, by
decreasing the area that is doped positively in a p-mos transistor, it is possible to
reduce also the effective width of the transistor. Hence, to decrease the strength of
a transistor it is sufficent to apply p-dopant to an area smaller than the active area
of the transistor. Since the active area and the p-dopant and n-dopant layers use
different masks, this can easily be done without changing the manufacturing process.
One of the major advantages of the proposed dopant Trojans is that they cannot
be detected using optical reverse-engineering. Detecting changes done to metal or
polysilicon layers, and to some degree also to active areas, can be relatively easily
detected using scanning electron microscopes. Changes to the dopant layer, on the
contrary, are almost invisible to these techniques. This properties is succesfully com-
mercially deployed for code-obfuscation [40]. This fact demonstrate that our newly
proposed dopant Trojans are extremely stealthy as well as practically feasable.
How these modifications can be used in a larger design to build useful and stealthy
hardware Trojans is discussed using two case studies as examples, a Trojan inserted
into the cryptographically secure post-processing of Intel’s RNG design as it is used
in the Ivy Bridge processors, and an SBox implementation of a side-channel resistant
logic style.
5.1.2 Case study: A Dopant-Trojan for a Secure RNG Design
In this section we apply the concepts of our dopant Trojans to a meaningful, high-
profile target to demonstrate the danger and practicability of the proposed Trojans.
Our first target is a design based on Intel’s new cryptographically secure RNG. Most
prominently, it is used in the Ivy Bridge processors but will most likely be used in
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other designs in the future. We chose this target because of its potential for real-
world impact and because there is detailed information available about the design
and especially the way it is tested [33, 4, 79].
The cryptographically secure RNG generates unpredictable 128-bit random num-
bers. The security has been verified by an independent security company [33] and is
NIST SP800-90, FIPS 140-2, and ANSI X9.82 compliant. We will modify the digital
post-processing of the design at the sub-transistor level to compromise the security
of keys generated with this RNG. Our Trojan is capable of reducing the security of
the produced random number from 128 bits to n bits, where n can be chosen. De-
spite these changes, the modified Trojan RNG passes not only the Built-In-Self-Test
(BIST) but also generates random numbers that pass the NIST test suite for random
numbers.
In the following section we first summarize the design of Intel’s RNG and then
discuss our malicious modifications.
5.1.2.1 Intel’s Secure TRNG Design
Like most modern RNGs, Intel’s RNG design consists of an entropy source (ES)
and digital post-processing. Figure 5.2 provides an overview of the RNG design. The
design also features a Built-In-Self-Test (BIST) unit that checks, at each power up,
the correct functioning of the entropy source and the digital post-processing.
The netropy source is a metastable circuit based on two cross coupled inverters
with adaptive feedback. The digital post-processing consists of a Online Health Test
(OHT) unit and a cryptographically secure Deterministic Random Bit Generator
(DRBG). The OHT monitors the random numbers from the entropy source to ensure
that the random numbers have a minimum entropy.
The Deterministic Random Bit Generator itself consists of two parts, a conditioner
and a rate matcher. The conditioner is used to compute new seeds for the rate
67
matcher. Based on the current state, the rate matcher computes 128-bit random
numbers. Reseeding is done whenever the conditioner has collected enough random
numbers from the entropy source, or if at most 512 128-bit random numbers have
been generated by the rate matcher. The conditioner as well as the rate-matcher are
based on AES.
Figure 5.2. Overview of Intel’s RNG design. An Entropy Source (TRNG) gener-
ates truly random numbers whose entropy is monitored by the Online Health Test
(OHT). The random numbers are then fed to a digital random bit generator (DRBG)
consisting of a Conditioner and a Rate Matcher. The Conditioner is used to periodi-
cally reseed the Rate Matcher which provides the output RnRand of the RNG. The
correct functioning of the RNG is checked at each power up using the Build-In Self
Test (BIST). The Trojan is inserted into the 256 bit state of the Rate Matcher.
The rate matcher generates the 128-bit output r of the RNG and takes the seed
(s, t) generated by the conditioner unit as input. The rate matcher has two internal
state registers: a 128-bit register K and a 128-bit register c. During normal operation,
the rate matcher generates 128 random bits r and updates the state registers in the
following way (r, c, K)=Generate(c,K):
1. c = c + 1, r = AESK(c)
2. c = c + 1, x = AESK(c)
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3. c = c + 1, y = AESK(c)
4. K = K ⊕ x
5. c = c ⊕ y
Whenever the conditioner has a new seed, consisting of the 128-bit values s and t,
available the internal states c and K are reseeded using the (c,K)=Reseed(s,t,c,K)
function:
1. c = c + 1, x = AESK(c)
2. c = c + 1, y = AESK(c)
3. K = K ⊕ x ⊕ s,
4. c = c ⊕ y ⊕ t
Under low load, the rate matcher reseeds after each output of r. Under heavy load, the
rate matcher generates several random numbers r before it reseeds, up to a maximum
of 512. However, even under heavy, load the rate matcher should reseed long before
reaching its maximum of 512 [33].
5.1.2.2 Dopant-Trojan for Intel’s DRBG
A 128-bit random number r generated by the rate matcher is the result of an AES
encryption with an unknown 128-bit random input c and an unknown, random key
K. The attacker has a chance of 1/2128 to correctly guess a random number resulting
in an attack complexity of 128-bits. The goal of our Trojan is to reduce the attack
complexity to n bits, while being as stealthy as possible. This is achieved by cleverly
applying our dopant-based Trojan idea described in Section 5.1.1 to internal flip-flops
used in the rate matcher. In the first step we modify the internal flip-flops that store
K in a way that K is set to a constant. In the second step the flip-flops storing c
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are modified in the same way, but n flip-flops of c are not manipulated. Hence, only
(128 − n) flip-flops of c are set to a constant value. This has the effect that a 128-
bit random number r depends only on n random bits and 128 + (128 − n) constant
bits known to the Trojan designer. The owner of the Trojan can therefore predict
a 128-bit random number r with a probability of 1/2n. This effectively reduces the
attack complexity from 128-bit down to n bits. On the other hand, for an evaluator
who does not know the Trojan constants, r looks random and legitimate since AES
generates outputs with very good random properties, even if the inputs only differ in
a few bits.
Our Trojan can be implemented by only modifying the flip-flops storing c and K,
while all other parts of the target design remain untouched. Two different Trojan
flip-flops are needed: one which sets the flip-flop output to a constant ‘1’ and one
which outputs a constant ‘0’ regardless of the inputs. The DFFR X1 flip-flop of
the used Nangate Open Cell library [39] has two outputs, Q and its inverse QN . To
implement our Trojan, the drain contact of the p-MOS transistor that generates signal
Q is shortened to VDD by applying n-dopant above the drain contact, as explained in
Section 5.1.1. Simultaneously, the source contact of the n-MOS transistor for signal
Q is disabled by applying p-dopant to the source contact. Hence, the output signal
Q generates a constant output of VDD regardless of its input. The inverse output
QN is modified in the same way, only that this time the drain contact of the n-MOS
transistor is shortened to GND and the source contact of the p-MOS transistor is
disabled. This leads to a constant output of ‘0’ for QN . The same modifications
are used to generate a flip-flop Trojan to constantly provide an output of Q=‘0’ and
QN=‘1’ by switching the roles of the n-MOS and p-MOS transistors. Note that only
four of the 32 transistors of the DFFR X1 flip-flop are modified as can be seen in
Figure 5.3. But 28 transistors on the other hand stay untouched and therefore will
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still switch according to the input. This results in a smaller but still similar power
consumption for a Trojan flip-flop compared to a Trojan-free flip-flop.
Figure 5.3. Layout of the Trojan DFFR X1 gate. The gate is only modified in the
highlighted area by changing the dopant mask. The resulting Trojan gate has an
output of Q = VDD and QN = GND.
5.1.2.3 Defeating Functional Testing and Statistical Tests
It is a standard procedure to test each produced chip for manufacturing defects.
In addition to these tests, the produced RNGs will also be tested against a range
of statistical tests in order to be NIST SP800-90 and FIPS 140-2 compliance. Fur-
thermore, to be compliant with FIPS 140-2, the RNG needs to be tested at each
power-up to ensure that no aging effects have damaged the RNG. For this purpose
Intel’s RNG design includes a Built-In-Self-Test unit that checks the correct func-
tioning of the RNG in two steps after each power-up. In the first step, the entropy
source is disabled and replaced by a 32-bit LFSR that produces a known stream of
pseudo-random bits. The BIST uses this pseudo-random bit stream to verify the
correct functioning of the OHT and feeds this bitstream to the conditioner and rate
matcher. A 32-bit CRC checksum of the 4 x 128-bit output buffer that stores the last
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four outputs r1,...,r4 of the rate matcher is computed. This 32-bit CRC checksum
is compared against a hard-coded value to verify the correct functioning of the con-
ditioner and rate matcher. If the checksum matches, the RNG has passed the first
part of the BIST. In the second part of the BIST the conditioner, rate matcher and
output buffer are reset and the entropy source is connected again. The OHT tests
the entropy of the entropy source and simultaneously seeds the conditioner and rate
matcher. If the OHT signals the BIST that the entropy of the entropy source is high
enough, the BIST is passed and the RNG can generate random numbers.
In [4] it is stated that “This BIST logic avoids the need for conventional on-chip
test mechanisms (e.g., scan and JTAG) that could undermine the security of the
DRNG.” This fact is also mentioned in an Intel presentation in which it is argued
that for security reasons the RNG circuitry should be free of scan chains and test
ports [79]. Therefore, to prevent physical attacks, only the BIST should be used to
detect manufacturing defects. From an attacker’s point of view, this means that a
hardware Trojan that passes the BIST will also pass functional testing. Although
Intel’s BIST is very good at detecting manufacturing and aging defects, it turns out
that it cannot prevent our dopant Trojans. One simple approach to overcome the
BIST would be to add a dopant Trojan into the BIST itself to constantly disable
the error flag. However, it could be very suspicious if the BIST never reports any
manufacturing defects.
To pass the BIST, the Trojan rate matcher needs to generate outputs r′1,...,r
′
4
during the BIST that have the same 32-bit CRC checksum as the correct outputs
r1,...,r4. Since the input to the rate matcher during the BIST is known, the Trojan
designer can compute the expected 32-bit CRC checksum. He then only needs to find
a suitable value for the Trojan constants c[1 : 128] and K[1 : 128 − n], which generate
the correct CRC checksum for the inputs provided during the BIST. Since the chance
that two outputs have the same 32-bit CRC is 1/232, the attacker only needs 232/2
72
tries on average to find values for c and K that result in the expected 32-bit CRC.
This can easily be done by simulation. By cleverly choosing c and K the Trojan now
passes the BIST, while the BIST will still detect manufacturing and aging defects
and therefore raises no suspicion.
Since the Trojan RNG has an entropy of n bits and uses a very good digital post-
processing, namely AES, the Trojan easily passes the NIST random number test suite
if n is chosen sufficiently high by the attacker. We tested the Trojan for n = 32 with
the NIST random number test suite and it passed for all tests. The higher the value
n that the attacker chooses, the harder it will be for an evaluator to detect that the
random numbers have been compromised.
Detecting this Trojan using optical reverse engineering is extremely difficult since
only the dopant masks of a few transistors have been modified. As discussed, detecting
modifications in the dopant mask is extremely difficult in a large design, especially
since only a small portion of a limited number of gates were modified. Since optical
reverse-engineering is not feasible and our Trojan passes functional testing, a verifier
cannot distinguish a Trojan design from a Trojan-free design. This also means that
the verifier is not able to reliably verify a golden chip. But without such a verified
golden chip, most post-manufacturing Trojan detection mechanisms do not work.
5.2 Side-Channel based Dopant-Trojans
With the second case study we want to emphasize the flexibility of the dopant
Trojan. Instead of modifying the logic behavior of a design, the dopant Trojan is
used to establish a hidden side-channel to leak out secret keys. We prove this concept
by inserting a hidden side-channel into an AES SBox implemented in a side-channel
resistant logic style.
We chose the side-channel resistant logic style iMDPL for our target implementa-
tion despite the fact that it has some known weaknesses, namely imbalanced routing,
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that can enable some side-channel attacks [58]. Our target iMDPL SBox is reasonably
secure and we would like to stress that the focus of this work is hardware Trojans and
not side-channel resistant logic styles. Our point here is that our Trojan modifications
do not reduce the side-channel resistance against common side-channel attacks while
enabling the Trojan owner to recover the secret key. In the following section a brief
introduction of iMDPL is given and then the dopant based side-channel Trojan is
explained.
5.2.1 Target iMDPL Design
The improved Masked Dual Rail Logic (iMDPL) was introduced in [65] as an
improvement of the Masked Dual-Rail Logic (MDPL) [66]. There are three main
ideas incorporated in iMDPL:
1. Dual-Rail: for every signal a, both the true and the complementary signal
(indicated with a¯) are computed. Therefore the same number of 1’s and 0’s are
computed regardless of the input. This prevents attacks based on the Hamming
weight.
2. Precharge phase: Between two clock cycles, there is always a precharge phase in
which all iMDPL gates (besides registers which have to be treated differently)
are set to 0. This prevents attacks based on the Hamming distance.
3. Mask bit: Due to imbalances in routing inverse signals and process variations,
the power consumption of a signal a might differ from that of its inverse signal
a¯ which can lead to side-channel attacks. In iMDPL a random mask bit is used
to randomly choose between a and a¯ to mask the power consumption.
In an iMDPL gate, every input and output bit as well as its inverse is masked with
a mask bit m. An iMDPL-AND gate performing the operation q = a & b has six
inputs: The masked input values am = a ⊕ m, a¯m = a ⊕ m¯, bm = b ⊕ m, b¯m = b ⊕ m¯
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and the mask bit m and its inverse m¯. The two outputs of an iMDPL-AND are
qm = q ⊕ m and q¯m = q ⊕ m¯.
The schematic of an iMDPL-AND gate is shown in Figure 5.4. It consists of a
detection stage, an SR-latch stage and two majority gates with complementary inputs.
If one input of a 3-input majority gate is set to 0, the majority gate behaves like an
AND gate. If one input is set to 1, the majority gate behaves like an OR gate. For
the mask bit m = 0, the lower Majority gate with the inputs am, bm and m computes
q = qm = a & b and the upper majority gate computes q¯ = q¯m = a¯ | b¯. For the
mask bit m = 1 on the other hand the lower majority gate computes q¯ = qm = a¯ | b¯
and the upper majority gate computes q = q¯m = a & b. Hence, the current mask bit
decides which inputs and outputs are the correct ones and which the inverse. It is also
possible to create an iMDPL-OR and iMDPL-NOR gate using the same structure by
switching the outputs and/or inputs. In iMDPL all combinational logic is build using
these four basic operations (AND, NAND, OR and NOR). The detection and SR-latch
stage was introduced in iMDPL to prevent the early propagation effect and glitches
by making sure that all inputs are in a complementary stage before evaluating. A
more detailed description of iMDPL can be found in [65].
As in the previous sections, the 45nm Nangate Open Cell library was used for our
implementation of an area optimized Canright [20] AES SBox in iMDPL. Since the
target library does not have a 3-input majority gate, we used a six input AND-OR-
INVERTER (AOI) gate configured as a 3-input not-majority gate together with an
inverter to build the majority gate2.
2We would like to note that the layout of a majority gate is very similar to an AOI gate and we
verified that the Trojan also works with a standard majority gate.
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Figure 5.4. Schematic of an iMDPL-AND gate consisting of two Majority gates, a
detection logic and an SR-latch stage[65].
5.2.2 iMDPL Dopant Trojan
To insert a Trojan into the iMDPL SBox implementation, we replace two AOI
gates from a single iMDPL gate with Trojan AOI gates that create a predictable,
data-dependent power consumption independent from the mask bit. Modifying only
single gates makes inserting the Trojan into the design after place & route very simple,
since we do not need to worry about any additional routing or find empty space in
the design. Figure 5.2.2 shows the schematic of the used AOI gate configured as a 3-
input not-majority gate. Two changes are made to this not-majority gate to create a
large data-dependent power consumption. First, the two topmost p-MOS transistors
are removed by shorting their output contacts to VDD. Secondly, the strength of the
remaining p-MOS transistors is decreased by decreasing their effective width. These
changes are depicted on the right side of Figure 5.2.2.
The Trojan not-majority gate behaves like the Trojan-free gate except for the
input pattern A = 0, B = 1, and C = 1. In the unmodified not-majority gate
the pull-up network is inactive and the pull-down network is active, resulting in an



























Figure 5.5. Schematic of the Trojan-free and Trojan AOI222 X1 gate configured
as a 3-input not-majority gate.
network are both active for this input pattern. Due to the reduced size of the p-MOS
transistors, the pull-up network is much weaker than the pull-down network and the
resulting output voltage is therefore still close to 0. In a sense we have turned the
not-majority gate into a pseudo-n-MOS gate for this input pattern. Hence, the output
values of both the Trojan-free and Trojan gate are the same, but there is a large power
consumption in the Trojan gate for this input pattern due to the connection between
GND and VDD. For all other inputs only the pull-up or pull-down network is active
for the Trojan gate as well as the Trojan-free gate.
If the two not-majority gates of the iMDPL gate are exchanged with this Trojan
gate, a high power consumption is generated whenever one of the two AOI gates has
the input A = 0, B = 1, and C = 1. In our configuration this is the case if am = 0,
bm = 1, m = 1 or if a¯m = 0, b¯m = 1, m¯ = 1 which turns out to be the case for
a = 1, b = 0 regardless of the value of m. Hence, the Trojan iMDPL gate has a
data-dependent power consumption that is independent of the mask bit m.
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We used the technique of dopant Trojans described in Section 5.1.1 to realize
our Trojan AOI gate. The modifications were done using Cadence Virtuoso Layout
editor and are shown in Figure 5.6(b). The Trojan gate passed the DRC check and
we used Calibre PEX in Virtuoso to do the netlist and parasitic extraction. The
Trojan and Trojan-free gate were simulated in HSpice. The propagation delay, rise
and fall time of a Trojan iMDPL gate are very similar to the Trojan-free iMDPL
implementation. This makes it possible to place our Trojan gates even in the critical
path without creating timing violations. The additional power consumption when
the Trojan activates depends on the used clock frequency, since the majority of power
consumption of the Trojan is static current due to the connection between VDD and
GND. Even at a very high frequency such as 10 GHZ, the Trojan gate consume
roughly twice as much power when the Trojan activates compared to the Trojan-free
counterpart.
(a) Trojan-free AOI gate (b) Trojan AOI gate
Figure 5.6. On the left (a) the layout of the unmodified AOI222 X1 gate and on
the right (b) the Trojan AOI222 X1 gate is shown. In the Trojan gate the p-MOS
transistors in the upper left active area have been shorted with the n-well by replacing
the p-implant with n-implant. The strength of the remaining p-MOS transistors in
the upper right active area have been reduced by decreasing the p-implant in this
area.
To insert our Trojan iMDPL gate in the layout of the target SBox implementation
after place & route we need to identify an iMDPL gate that serves as a suitable Trojan
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location and replace the AOI gates of this target iMDPL gate with the Trojan AOI
gate. Finding a suitable location does not require a detailed knowledge of the target
SBox. In fact, the right location can be identified using simulation. The individual
iMDPL gates can easily be identified by searching for AOI gates connected with
inverse inputs. In the first step, we simulated the SBox for all 512 possible inputs (for
each mask there are 256 different inputs) and stored the inputs and outputs for the
tested AOI gates. Then, a matlab script was used to test the performance of possible
Trojan target locations. We chose a target location that (1) had a small correlation
with the Trojan power model for all false key guesses to make it easy for the owner of
the Trojan to use it and (2) a location which did not increase the vulnerability against
the considered side-channel attacks. We tested (2) by performing the considered side-
channel attacks on hypothetical power traces based on the Trojan power model. Once
we located a good Trojan location we simply replaced the corresponding AOI gates
with the Trojan AOI gate.
5.2.3 Trojan Effectiveness Evaluation
To verify the correct functioning of the Trojan iMDPL gate and to show that the
Trojan gates do not violate timing requirements even if the Trojan gate is placed in
the critical path, transistor-level simulations were performed. These simulations of a
Trojan and a Trojan-free iMDPL gate were performed using HSpice and the parasitic
extraction was done by Calibre PEX. Table 5.1 shows the delay, rise and fall times
of the Trojan-free and the Trojan iMDPL gate for a load capacitance of 5.4fF, the
equivalent of the gate capacitance of two iMDPL gates. The Trojan-free and the
Trojan gate have very similar timing characteristics. In most cases the Trojan gate is
even faster than the Trojan-free gate. Therefore, it is possible to exchange an iMDPL
gate with a Trojan iMDPL gate even if it is in a time-critical path.
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Trojan-free Trojan gate
A B M 0→1 1→0 Risetime 0→1 1→0 Risetime
0 0 0 121.7 ps 83.51 ps 20.70 ps 115.6 ps 85.78 ps 20.23 ps
0 0 1 119.0 ps 78.45 ps 19.67 ps 111.7 ps 79.88 ps 19.44 ps
0 1 0 147.0 ps 84.00 ps 31.60 ps 134.2 ps 85.65 ps 26.75 ps
0 1 1 149.0 ps 81.82 ps 26.49 ps 136.1 ps 82.78 ps 27.78 ps
1 0 0 153.2 ps 85.49 ps 31.60 ps 142.1 ps 74.69 ps 32.74 ps
1 0 1 152.0 ps 82.47 ps 28.45 ps 139.3 ps 70.72 ps 31.15 ps
1 1 0 135.0 ps 78.15 ps 25.80 ps 125.7 ps 81.12 ps 25.37 ps
1 1 1 138.1 ps 80.66 ps 27.57 ps 128.6 ps 84.54 ps 26.83 ps
Table 5.1. Performance of the Trojan-free and Trojan iMDPL-AND gate for different
input patterns and a load capacitance of 5.4fF. A and B depict the unmasked inputs
to the iMDPL-AND gate and M the mask bit. The column “ 0 → 1” shows the
propagation delay of the evaluation phase and “1 → 0” the propagation delay of the
precharge phase in picoseconds. “Risetime” represents the risetime of either Ym or
Y¯m during the evaluation phase.
For the simulation of the entire SBox after place & route Synopsys Nanosim was
used. Nanosim is not as precise as HSpice but the used simulation configuration3 is
still very precise and does take internal and routing capacitances into account. The
needed interconnect parasitics were extracted using Cadence Encounter and Calibre
PEX was used again to extract the transistor level parasitics of the Trojan and Trojan
free AOI gate. The transistor level parasitics for the other gates were taken from the
NangateOpenCell library. The side-channel analysis was performed using Matlab
scripts.
To verify the correct functioning of our Trojan we performed a side-channel attack
with the Trojan power model using the Trojan Sbox implementation and the Trojan-
free implementation on simulated power traces. Figure 5.7(a) shows the result of
the attack on the Trojan SBox and Figure 5.7(b) shows the result of performing
3 Simulations were performed with Synopsis Nanosim using the following configuration: sim=4,
model=4, net=4, set powernet default mode=5, set sim ires 1pA, set print ires 1pA and set sim leak
ires=1fA.
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the same attack on the Trojan-free implementation. The correct key can clearly be
distinguished for the Trojan SBox with a correlation close to 1. It is also interesting
to note that the Trojan generates leakage current compared to switching current.
Hence, one can make power measurements after most switching activity has occurred
and use integration to increase the signal-to-noise ratio. This makes using the Trojan
easy in a practical setting. As expected, the Trojan power model does not reveal the
key in the Trojan-free implementation, which shows that the side-channel was indeed
produced by the added Trojan.
(a) Trojan design (b) Trojan-free design
Figure 5.7. 1-Bit CPA on (a) the Trojan design and (b) the Trojan-free design using
the Trojan power model with the evaluation phase starting at 0ns and the precharge
phase starting at 15ns. The correct key is shown in black and the false keys are shown
in gray. The correlation for the correct key in the Trojan design goes up to 0.9971.
We then compared the side-channel resistance of the Trojan implementation with
the Trojan-free implementation. Covering all possible side-channel attacks out of
the scope of this paper. We therefore only considered some of the most common
side-channel attacks, namely 1- and 8-bit CPA [17] and MIA [28]. We found a small
vulnerability in the Trojan-free design, which is in line with the results from [58].
However, the Trojan did not increase this weakness and the Trojan design is as side-
channel resistant as the Trojan-free design against the considered side-channel attacks.
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In the following a detailed analysis of the side-channel resistance of the Trojan and
Trojan-free design is provided.
5.2.4 Side-Channel Analysis of the Trojan and Trojan-Free Design
The target iMDPL SBox implementation suffers to a certain degree from the gen-
eral problem of iMDPL, pointed out by Moradi et al. [58], namely that the different
masks have different routing and timing characteristics and therefore a different power
profile. During the precharge phase a Correlation-Power Analysis (CPA) [17] using an
8-bit Hamming weight (HW) model is feasible as can be seen in Figure 5.8(a). How-
ever, the simulations are noise free, meaning there is no algorithmic noise from other
SBoxes and other parts of the AES algorithm such as MixedColumns. Furthermore,
no measurement noise nor thermal noise is present as well as no filtering effects due to
sense resistors and capacitances of the global power supply as in a real measurement.
In a real-world scenario the measured correlation would therefore be much smaller
and the attack not trivial. For all other time instances outside the shown 14.8ns to
16ns window the 8-bit CPA was unsuccessful.
(a) Trojan-free design (b) Trojan design
Figure 5.8. 8-Bit HW CPA attack on (a) the Trojan-free design and (b) the Trojan
design with the precharge phase starting at 15ns. The correct key, highlighted in
black, can be distinguished. However, the correlation coefficient of the attack for
both the Trojan and Trojan-free is the same.
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(a) MIA attack (b) 1-Bit CPA
Figure 5.9. Figure (1) shows the result of a MIA attack with a 1024 bin histogram
method and an 8-bit HW distinguisher for the Trojan design. The correct key, high-
lighted in black, never reaches the maximum for any time period and therefore the
attack is unsuccessful. On the right the results of a 1-bit CPA on the first bit of the
SBox output of the Trojan design is shown. Again the correct key, highlighted in
black, can not be distinguished from false keys at any time instance.
But the insertion of the Trojan does not have any impact on the attack as can be
seen in Figure 5.8(b). The correlation during the point of attack does not increase
but stays the same. For all other time instances the correct key cannot be recovered
using the 8-Bit CPA and therefore the Trojan does not decrease the security against
this attack.
1-bit CPA attacks on the output of the Trojan design were unsuccessful for all 8
bits. As an example, Figure 5.9(b) shows the result of the 1-bit CPA attack using
the least significant SBox bit. For no point in time does the correct key reach a
maximum. Interestingly, Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) [28] was unsuccessful
even at the time instance where the CPA was successful for both the Trojan as well as
the Trojan-free design. A 1024 bin histogram method with an 8-bit HW distinguisher
was used for the first MIA on the Trojan design. The result of this attack can be seen
in Figure 5.8(b). The correct key cannot be distinguished from false keys since the
correct key never reaches a maximum mutual information value. We assume that —
likely by happenstance of the routing algorithm — the leakage during precharge must
83
behave very close to the Hamming weight power model and therefore the CPA is more
successful than MIA. Before using an area-optimized Canright AES SBox we tested
our iMDPL design flow using a table look-up based AES SBox which resulted in a
much larger design. For this design, MIA actually performed better than CPA in the
8-bit HW model which suggests that it depends on the design and routing algorithm
if MIA attacks have better results than CPA attacks. We also tried to increase the
bin size to 20000 but the MIA remained unsuccessful.
Further, MIA attacks with a distinguisher based on 4 or 6 bits of the SBox output
were performed. These attacks were unsuccessful for both the Trojan as well as
Trojan-free design. It is important to note that the Trojan was placed in a well
chosen location so that the Trojan power model does not have a direct relation to
the SBox output. This explains why the Trojan was not detected by MIA attacks
since the output of the SBox is used as an input to the distinguisher function. The
well chosen position of the Trojan is also the main reason why the 1- and 8-bit CPA
attack did not reveal the Trojan. We specifically chose the Trojan to not be triggered
by these power models.
Since the Trojan did not reduce the resistance to 8-Bit HW CPA attacks compared
to the Trojan-free implementations and all other attacks were unsuccessful on the
Trojan design, the introduced Trojan does not reduce the side-channel resistance
against the considered side-channel attacks. Therefore, to an evaluator testing these
side-channel attacks, the Trojan design appears to be side-channel resistant. The
owner of the Trojan on the other hand can use the secret Trojan power model to
successfully attack the design. But we would like to note that this does not mean that
the Trojan is undetectable using other side-channel attacks. However, the analysis
shows that if the attacker knows the methods the design will be tested again (e.g.
because it is listed in a standard) he can specifically design the Trojan so that these
attacks are unsuccessful.
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The side-channel analysis showed that we have successfully established a hid-
den side-channel that can leak out secret keys very reliably while not decreasing the
side-channel resistance against the most common side-channel attacks. Hence, the
newly introduced Trojan side-channel can only be used by the owner of the Tro-
jan who knows the secret Trojan power model. Since we did not change the logic
behavior of any gate, functional testing cannot detect the Trojan. As discussed in
Section 5.1.1, detecting this Trojan using optical inspection is very challenging since
we only modified the dopant masks. Without being able to detect the Trojan using
functional testing or optical inspection, an attacker cannot distinguish a Trojan chip
from a Trojan-free chip. Hence, an evaluator cannot verify a golden chip and therefore
methods that rely on a golden chip have only limited use in detecting the Trojan.
This shows that detecting a dopant-based side-channel Trojan would be challenging
in practice using known methods.
5.3 Side-Channel based Hardware Trojans at the Gate Level
The layout level hardware Trojan introduced in the previous sections are especially
well suited to be inserted by a malicious factory. However, hardware Trojans can
also be inserted at other stages in the design process. Hardware Trojans could, for
example, be inserted into 3rd part IP-cores. In this case, the Trojans will likely not
be realized at the layout level but at the gate level, since many IP-cores are sold as
a netlist or as HDL code. In the following some results on how side-channels Trojans
can be inserted at the gate level are summarized.
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5.3.1 Passive Side-channel Trojans
4 The techniques discussed in Chapter 3 can directly be applied to hardware Tro-
jans [44, 50]. The main difference is that a hardware Trojan does not transmit a
signature but some kind of secret information, e.g., a key. As a matter of fact, the
side-channel based hardware watermark design was mainly derived from the Trojan
side-channels presented in [50]. Except for small modifications, the design of a side-
channel watermark and a side-channel hardware Trojan is the same. Both, the input
modulated as well as the spread spectrum approach, can be used to implement hard-
ware Trojans. Figure 5.10 [50] shows the principle of the Trojan side-channel. The
main idea is to add additional gates to the design which establish a hidden com-
muication channel using an intentional side-channel to leak out a secret key. This
is achieved by adding additional gates that do not change the logical output of the
design, but only modifies the power consumption. The number of additional gates
needed for this side-channel Trojan can be very small. In the proof-of-concept im-
plementation in [50] the input-modulated Trojan, which could leak out parts of the
round keys during an AES encryption, only consisted of roughly 20 gates.
One nice property of side-channel Trojans is that they do not need an activation
mechanism. Because they do not change the output of the design, they can always be
active. Hence, Trojan detection approaches that are based on detecting the activation
mechanism, such as functional testing, will not detect side-channel based Trojans.
Most other Trojan detection mechanisms proposed in the literature require a golden
model. A golden model is a reference chip that does not have any hardware Trojans
embedded. However, it is not always guaranteed that such a golden model exists.
If the Trojan is inserted at the design stage, every chip has the Trojan embedded
4The subsection “Passive side-channel Trojans” describes content developed mainly by my col-
leagues Wayne Burleson, Tim Güneysu, Markus Kasper, Lang Lin, Oliver Mischke, Amir Moradi
and Christof Paar, and and was included for sake of completeness.
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Figure 5.10. Principle of the Trojan side-channel [50]. A Trojan side-channel c that
leaks out the secret key K is inserted into the power consumption of the device. Only
the attacker knowing the Trojan secret can recover the key K from c. An evaluator
on the other hand cannot distinguish c from noise.
and no Trojan-free circuit exits. To detect the Trojan an evaluator can try use use
general side-channel analysis to detect if the design leaks out a secret. However,
such a side-channel analysis extremely difficult, since the Trojan side-channel does
not follow common power models. If the Trojan side-channel is well designed, such
analysis will not be able to detect the Trojan side-channel. Another approach to
detect this type of Trojan is to use some kind of data-flow analysis to detect that the
additional gates are not needed for the correct functioning of the IP core. However,
clever implementing the Trojan can counteract this.
How powerful such a side-channel based hardware Trojan could be in practice
was demonstrated in [44]. The side-channel Trojan is used to leak out the mask of a
masked AES encryption. Without knowing the mask values, the design is side-channel
resistant. However, since the Trojan established a hidden communication channel to
covertly leak out the mask value for each encryption, the design can be attacked by
the Trojan owner. What makes this Trojan so powerful is the fact that detecting this
hidden communication channel is close to impossible. If the key would be leaked out
directly, this might be possibly be detected using sophisticated side-channel attacks
such as collision attacks or fixed-vs-random tests [29]. However, since not the key but
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the secret and randomly generated mask bits are leaked instead, these approaches do
not work.
Inserting additional gates into a design after place and route is not a straightfor-
ward task. There are typically unused spaces in the design but adding additional gates
also requires additional routing. How difficult it is to add these gate level hardware
Trojans at the manufacturing stage is therefore still an open research problem.
Furthermore, even the insertion of only a few gates by a foundry at the mask
level can be detected reliably using optical reverse-engineering. Using optical reverse-
engineering, the verifier can compare photos of a decaped chip at different layers
with the corresponding mask. Small differences between the mask and the die photos
might not be recognized due to dirt on the lenses etc. However, additional metal
wires and gates can easily be detectable using an automated recognition algorithm,
even if there are millions of transistors in a design.
In summary, gate level side-channel Trojans are especially well suited to be in-
serted into IP-cores before manufacturing. Detecting these Trojans are very difficult
as no activation mechanism is needed and functional testing will not reveal them. But
if gate level Trojans are inserted at during manufacturing, optical reverse-engineering
can reveal the additional gates and especially the additional routing. Note that opti-
cal reverse-engineering is a destructive technique and quite time and labor intensive.
Hence, it can be assumed that only a few chips will be examined with this technique.
5.3.2 Active Side-channel Trojans
In the previous sections we have always used intentional side-channels to transmit
data from the IC to the outside world. However, side-channels can also be used
to transmit data from the outside to the IC. Such an active side-channel can for
example be used to activate a hardware Trojan as has been demonstrated at the
NYU Poly embedded system challenges. For example, during the 2010 challenge our
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team implemented a timing based Trojan that would activate not on specific inputs,
but on a specific delay pattern between inputs [13]. Hence, for this Trojan time was
used as a side-channel to transmit the trigger to the IC. But many more side-channels
besides time can be used as triggers. For example, we proposed to activate the Trojan
by altering the power supply of the Trojan in a specific pattern. The idea is to have
a ring-oscillator whose frequency is directly dependent on the supply voltage. If the
supply voltage is lowered the frequency of the ring oscillator decreases. This voltage
sensor can then be used as the input to a Trojan activation circuitry that monitors
the time the chip is in a high and low voltage state. When a specific pattern of high
and low input voltages is applied to the circuitry the Trojan is activated. While we
only proposed this Trojan but not implemented it in the NYU Poly challenge, the
team from Iowa State University implemented a similar idea and used heat to activate
the Trojan [70]. The idea to transmit and receive data using the heat side-channel
has also been proposed in [18]. Please note that these intentional side-channel are
realized using only digital logic and hence no analog logic is needed.
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CHAPTER 6
SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS ON DELAY-BASED PUFS
In this chapter we will take a closer look at the side-channel resistance of strong
PUFs against passive and attacks. In particular, two different classes of implemen-
tation attacks are considered, power side-channel analysis and fault attacks. As our
target we chose the Arbiter PUF, as it is the most widely discussed strong PUF
in the literature. We show that it is possible to attack the Arbiter PUF even in
scenarios where machine learning attacks are infeasible, i.e. when the attacker does
not directly have access to the individual response bits. Hence, our results raise
strong doubt whether the assumption that delay based PUFs are less prone to imple-
mentation attacks than traditional cryptographic algorithms holds true. It also raises
questions about the usefulness of delay-based PUFs in general. Since they loose much
of their
Most proposed weak PUF designs are either memory based or based on ring-
oscillators. The Arbiter PUF is the most promising strong PUF design that has
gained a lot of research attention. A detailed description of how Arbiter PUFs work
and how they can be modeled is presented in the next Section. In Section 6.1.3 a
secure PUF designed based on an Arbiter PUF is introduced under the assumption
that the PUF achieves a reliability close to 100%. This secure design will be used
as the target design for the active and passive side-channel attacks in Section 6.2.2
and 6.3.2 respectively.
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6.1 Target PUF Design
6.1.1 Arbiter PUF
The basic idea of the Arbiter PUF is to apply a race signal to two identical paths
and determine which of the two paths is faster. The two paths have an identical
layout so that the delay difference ∆D between the two signals mainly depends on
process variations. This dependency on process variations ensures that each chip
will have a unique delay behavior. The Arbiter PUF gets a challenge as its input
which defines the exact paths the race signal takes. Figure 6.1 shows the schematic
of an Arbiter PUF. It consists of a top and bottom signal that is fed through delay
stages. Each individual delay stage consists of two 2-bit multiplexers (MUX) that
have identical layouts and that both get the bottom and top signals as inputs. If the
challenge bit for the current stage is ’1’ the multiplexers switch the top and bottom
signals, otherwise the two signals are not switched. Each individual transistor in the
multiplexers has a slightly different delay characteristic due to process variations and
hence the delay difference between the top and bottom signal are different for a ’1’
and a ’0’. This way the race signal can take many different paths: an n-stage Arbiter
PUF has 2n different paths the race signals can take. However, challenges that only
differ in a few bits have a very similar behavior so that an Arbiter PUF does not
necessarily have 2n unique challenges. An Arbiter at the end of the PUF determines
which of the two signals was faster. The Arbiter consists of two cross-coupled AND
gates which form a latch and will have an output of ’1’ if the top signal arrives first
and ’0’ if the bottom signal is the first to arrive. The Arbiter can have a slight bias
so that the PUF result might be slightly biased towards ’0’ or ’1’.
6.1.2 Modeling an Arbiter PUF
Arbiter PUFs can easily be modeled in software if the delays that are added by
each individual stages are known. Each stage has four delay values: the delay for
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Figure 6.1. Schematic of an n-bit Arbiter PUF.
the top and bottom signal for challenge bit ’1’ and for challenge bit ’0’. Since we
are actually not interested in the total delay but only in the delay difference, we can
reduce these four values to two values per stage i, the delay difference δ1,i between
the top and bottom signal for challenge bit ’1’ and the delay difference δ0,i for the
challenge bit ’0’. The delay difference is positive if the top signal is faster and negative
if the bottom signal is faster. The total delay difference ∆D for a given challenge
þC = c1, ...cn can be computed easily by adding up the individual delays for each
stage. If the challenge bit is ’1’ the wires are switched and the top signal becomes the
bottom signal and vise versa. The switching of the wires can be modeled by simply
multiplying the current delay difference with minus one. The time difference ∆Di
between the top and bottom signal after stage i can therefore easily be expressed
recursively with the following equation:
∆Di = ∆Di−1 ∗ (1 − 2 ∗ ci) + δci,i
The final time difference between the two signals is simply time difference ∆Dn




1 if ∆Dn > 0
0 if ∆Dn < 0
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This way the PUF can be modeled with 2∗n delay values. However, a more efficient
approach to model an n-stage Arbiter PUF that only requires n + 1 parameters is
used in practice. A PUF instance is described by the delay vector þw = (w1, ..., wn+1)
with:
w1 = δ0,1 − δ1,1
wi = δ0,i−1 + δ1,i−1 + δ0,i − δ1,i for 2 ≤ i ≤ n
wn+1 = δ0,n + δ1,n
The delay difference ∆Dn at the end of the Arbiter is the result of the scalar








(1 − 2cl) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Φn+1 = 1
Modeling a PUF in this way can significantly decreases the simulation time and
also reduces the parameters that need to be known to n + 1. It was shown in the
past how these parameters can be computed (or approximated) easily using different
machine learning techniques. In practice, only a few hundred challenge and response
pairs are needed to model an Arbiter PUF with a predication rate very close to the
reliability of the attacked PUF [38]. To make machine learning attacks more difficult,
some designs try to add a non-linear component to the Arbiter PUF e.g. by using
feed-forwards or by XORing the responses of several Arbiter PUFs. Although these
designs make machine learning attacks more difficult, they still do not provide a big
challenge from an attackers perspective. It has been shown that it is still fairly easy to
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achieve a prediction accuracy of above 98% percent using machine learning techniques
such as Evolution Strategies (ES) or Linear Regression (LR)[71].
6.1.3 Controlled PUF Design
As mentioned, unreliability and their weakness against machine learning attacks
are currently the main drawback of Arbiter PUFs. However, these two problems are
closely related: If non-linearity is added to an Arbiter PUF by means of a combination
function such as an XOR or by a feed-forward, the reliability decreases. This decrease
in reliability limits the number of non-linear additions that can be added to the Arbiter
PUF, since otherwise the PUF becomes too unreliable to be useful. Furthermore, in
some cases the accuracy of the machine learning attacks decreases slower than the
reliability, so that adding additional non-linearity can be counter productive from a
security perspective.
Since current PUF designs can easily be attacked using machine learning if the
attacker has access to challenge and response pairs, so called Controlled PUFs have
been proposed to prevent these attacks. The term controlled PUF was introduced by
Gassend et al. in [27] and the main idea is to add additional circuitry that prevents
an attacker to apply arbitrary challenges and, most importantly, hides the individual
response bits from the attacker. The main idea of most controlled PUFs is to instead
of applying the challenges to the PUF directly, a master challenge is sent to the chip.
From this master challenge, a challenge generator generates n individual challenges
that are applied to the PUF. The n individual response bits of this PUF are not
directly returned as outputs but instead are first applied to a cryptographically secure
one-way function (e.g. a hash function). Figure 6.2 shows an example implementation
of a Controlled PUF design and which is used as a case study in the remainder of
this chapter. By never revealing the individual response bits to the outside, machine
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Figure 6.2. The controlled PUF design. An 80-bit master challenge is applied to
the controlled PUF from which 80 individual sub-challenges are derived using the
challenge generator. These 80 sub-challenges are applied to the 128-bit Arbiter PUF
and the 80 PUF responses are stored in a shift register. This 80-bit string is hashed
using a cryptographically secure one-way function and the resulting 64-bit hash value
is provided as the final response of the controlled PUF.
learning attacks are not feasible any longer1.
Of course, the proposed design adds a non negligible overhead to the PUF design,
as a challenge generator and one-way function is needed. However, there exist several
secure lightweight encryption algorithms that could be used for this purpose. The
challenge generator generates n sub-challenges for a single master challenge. There
are two main requirements for the challenge generator:
1. A master challenge should not generate sub-challenges that are similar i.e. sub-
challenges that have large sequences of bits that are equal between these sub-
challenges.
2. Two master challenges should not generate sub-challenges that similar with each
other.
1This assumes that n is chosen sufficiently large and the PUF has enough entropy that brute-force
attacks are not possible.
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A simple LFSR for example would not be a good challenge generator, since a master
challenge of all ’0’s would generate individual challenges that also only consist of
all ’0’s. In this case all response bits will be the same as all individual challenges
are identical. But if none or only a few response bits are different it is not difficult
to reverse the one-way function since the entropy and therefore the computation
complexity is reduced greatly.
An example of a secure challenge generator would be a block cipher in counter
mode with the key as the master challenge. By definition, changing a single input
or key bit in a block cipher changes each output bit with a probability of 50%.
This makes it computationally infeasible for an attacker to find master challenges
that break requirement 1) or 2). A block cipher c = enck(p) can also be used as a
secure one-way function y = f(x) by encrypting a constant C using x as the key:
y = encx(C). By definition, it should be computationally infeasible to compute the
key of the block cipher even if the attacker has access to plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Hence, for a given y it is computationally infeasible to compute x. The fact that the
same design can be used as a challenge generator and as a one-way function greatly
reduces the introduced area overhead of a controlled PUF. Many lightweight block
ciphers exist such as PRESENT [16] or NSA’s lightweight block ciphers [9] that could
be used for this purpose. However, the results presented in this paper are sufficiently
general that other approaches such as using a secure hash function as the challenge
generator and secure one-way function can be used instead.
It is also important to note that the physical security requirements for the chal-
lenge generator and the one-way function are much lighter than for the case that
they are used with a traditional secret key that needs to be protected. The chal-
lenge generator only processes known values, hence it does not need to be resistant
against information leakage. The one-way function also has reduced physical security
requirements since it does not process a constant secret. For each master challenge,
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the input to the one-way function is different and unpredictable. Hence, differential
attacks such as DPA and CPA are not feasible. Therefore only implementation at-
tacks that can reveal information with a single input, e.g. a simple power analysis,
need to be considered. But defending against these types of side-channel attacks is
much easier than defending against differential side-channel attacks and most hard-
ware block-ciphers are secure against simple power analysis. Hence, to attack such a
system using implementation attacks, the attacker would need to directly attack the
Arbiter PUF and not the digital post-processing2.
In the following we will assume that a design as depicted in Figure 6.2 is used with
a block cipher such as PRESENT as the challenge generator and one-way functions as
well as an 80-bit shift register to store the 80 individual response bits. However, since
our attacks will actually directly target the 128-bit Arbiter (or the registers storing
the Arbiter response) and not the digital pre- or post-processing the results are also
valid for other designs that use an Arbiter PUF with known challenges.
6.2 Power Side-Channel Attack on Arbiter PUFs
In this section we will take a closer look at the resistance of Arbiter PUFs towards
passive power side-channel attacks. We assume that the attacker does not have access
to the challenge and response pairs because a controlled PUF design as described in
section 6.1.3 is used. The question is if the attacker can gain enough information
out of power side-channel measurements of the PUF to successfully model it. In the
following we will first take a closer look at the power consumption of the Arbiter
PUF and then show how this information can be used to attack controlled PUFs in
a combined machine learning and power side-channel attack.
2As mentioned, this assumes implementation attacks cannot reveal secret information from a
single trace. Some probing and fault attacks could therefore in theory still be used to attack the
hash function instead of the PUF.
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6.2.1 Power Consumption of Arbiter PUFs
To evaluate information leakage of an Arbiter PUF in the power consumption we
performed some simulations to test the power behavior of an 128-bit Arbiter PUF.
Figure 6.3 shows the power consumption of the tested 128-Bit Arbiter PUF in 45nm
technology. The PUF is the same design as described in Section 6.1.3 with one
addition: the result of the PUF is stored in a register. It is a reasonable assumption
to assume that the response bit is stored in a register, since the PUF response needs
to be processed further. There are two points of interest in the power traces. One
point of interest is when the Arbiter at the end of the PUF determines whether the
output is 1 or 0 and the second point of interest is when the result is stored in the
register. In this simulation the register was reset before the PUF execution. Figure 6.4
shows the correlation of 2000 power traces with the correct response bits as well as
the correlation with response bits with a prediction accuracy between 50% to 90%.
There is a strong correlation of the correct response bits and the power traces at two
time instances. At around 1350 ns when the PUF evaluates the response the power
traces show a correlation of -0.32 and when the response bit is stored in the flip flop
at 1600 ns the correlation is close to 1.
The reason why the correlation is negative at 1350 ns is because the power con-
sumption is actually higher if the response bit is 0 instead of 1 in this design due to
the implementation details of the Arbiter PUF. The fact that a correlation of close to
1 is achieved during the storing of the result in the register is not very surprising since
it is well known that a register has a large power consumption when the output value
changes. For prediction accuracies below 100% the correlation coefficient decreases
linearly. Hence, the correlation coefficient directly relates to the model accuracy and
it is possible to distinguish PUF models with a high accuracy from PUF models with
a low accuracy using the correlation coefficient.
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Since we only use a single register in this simulation, it is actually possible to
directly read out the response from the power trace. In practice, more switching
activity will likely occur from other sources such as state machines and challenge
generators. This introduces algorithmic noise to the power traces in addition to
measurement and environmental noise so that directly reading out the response bits
is likely impossible in practice.
Figure 6.3. Two power traces of an 128-bit Arbiter PUF for two different challenges,
one challenge with a response of 1 and one with a response of 0.
The data-dependent power consumption during the storing of the result is much
larger than the power consumption during the evaluation due to the fact that the
power consumption of a register is the highest when it is switching. However, in
practice the power consumption during the evaluation of the Arbiter might also be
an interesting attack point since it evaluates very late in the clock cycle and hence
there might be less algorithmic noise compared to the register which evaluates at the
rising edge of the clock cycle. In our controlled PUF design the response of the PUF
is stored in an 80-bit shift register. The assumption that the result of the arbiter
is stored in a n-bit shift-register is very reasonable if a design is used in which the
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Figure 6.4. The correlation of responses with different accuracies with 2000 simu-
lated power traces of a 128-bit Arbiter PUF.
PUF is called n times before the result is processed. Using a shift-register is the
most common and most efficient approach to store data in this case. The power
consumption of a shift register follows a Hamming distance model: If two consecutive
bits are different, then the stored values in the registers change and generate a large
power consumption. On the other hand, if two consecutive bits are the same then the
values do not change and hence consume only a small amount of power. The power
consumption of the shift-register is therefore directly proportional to the Hamming
distance between the current state of the shift register with the previous state.
During the evaluation of the Arbiter on the other hand the power consumption
is independent of the previous response bit. This is due to the fact that the PUF
is always set to the same state before the race signal is applied. Hence, the data-
dependent power consumption during the end of the evaluation phase of the Arbiter
PUF depends on a Hamming weight model. We have actually omitted a third time
instance in which the power consumption directly depends on the response bit. When
the Arbiter PUF is reset to the initial state to prepare for the next race signal there
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is again a data-dependent power consumption comparable to the power consumption
during evaluation.
It should also be noted that after the power-up the shift register will contain all
zeros. In this specific case the power consumption of storing the first response bit
in the register is also independent of previous responses and follows the Hamming
weight model. An attacker could power off and then power-on the device between
each measurement if he wanted to use the Hamming weight power model together
with the power consumption of the register. In our attack, the Hamming distance
power model on the shift register greatly outperformed the Hamming weight power
model so that this seems to be unnecessary or counter-productive for most attacks.
In practice, the side-channel measurements will contain noise from various sources.
The different noise sources are typically physical noise, measurement noise, model
matching noise, and algorithmic noise. Physical noise sums up noise sources such as
supply noise, thermal noise, and temperature differences. Measurement noise is added
by the measurement setup and includes noise added by the digital sampling or low
pass filters that are inevitably added by the measurement setup. The assumed power
model such as Hamming distance or Hamming weight is only an approximation of the
real power consumption of the device. For example, in the Hamming distance power
models it is assumed that a switching of 1 to 0 has the same power consumption as
the switching from 0 to 1. In practice, a switching from 1 to 0 might have a slightly
different power consumption than the switching from 0 to 1. This mismatch between
the real power consumption and the used power model is called model matching noise.
Algorithmic noise describes the power consumption caused by parts of the chip that
are not part of the power model of the attack but run in parallel. In the case of the
controlled PUF design, algorithmic noise could for example be the power consumption
of the challenge generator if it runs in parallel to the PUF, state machines or unrelated
parts of the chip such as communication logic.
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It is usually assumed that each of these noise sources are independent and there
is an additive effect between all the noise sources so that their overall effect can
be approximated by a Gaussian distribution [74]. Physical noise and measurement
noise can be reduced by averaging over several measurements. Algorithmic noise and
model matching noise on the other hand can often not be reduced using averaging
since the noise is usually constant for a given input. Only if the algorithmic noise is
independent from the input to the target IP core, e.g. a global counter, can averaging
be applied to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio.
Predicting the added noise is very difficult since it depends on so many factors.
Therefore different noise levels are used in the experiments to show that even in the
presence of substantial noise a side-channel attack is possible. The power traces in
the remainder of this work are recorded as follows: At first the power traces with
the (idealized) used power model are computed. In a 1-bit Hamming distance power
model this means that if the current response is different from the previous response
a 1 is assigned as the power value, otherwise a 0. To this noise-free power model
Gaussian noise, denoted as N (µ, σ2), with a mean value of µ and standard deviation
of σ is added to simulate the various noise sources. Note that the mean value µ does
not have any influence on the correlation coefficient and therefore in the following
N (0, σ2) is used. The metric N (0, σ2) might not be very intuitive to the reader and
therefore a second metric is used as well. The power consumption during the rising
edge of the clock is in many designs roughly proportional to the number of switching
registers. To get a rough idea of how much noise N (0, σ2) is we also represent the
noise as the amount of switching registers that would add algorithmic noise equivalent
to N (0, σ2). The amount of noise added by n independently and randomly (with a
probability of 50%) switching registers with an idealized power model is approximately




Target Design Power Model cc N (µN , σ2N), N. Registers
PIC16F886 [62] 8-bit HD ≈ 0.75 ≈ N (0, 5.1) ≈ 12.5
Yubikey 2 [62] (EM) 8-bit HW ≈ 0.3 ≈ N (0, 42) ≈ 161
Virtex-4 Bitstream [57] 1-bit HD ≈ 0.08 ≈ N (0, 39) ≈ 155
Virtex-5 Bitstream [57] 1-bit HD ≈ 0.04 ≈ N (0, 156) ≈ 623
SHA-1 EEPROM [62] 8-bit HW ≈ 0.1 ≈ N (0, 400) ≈ 1600
Kintex-7 FPGA [37] 8-bit HW ≈ 0.1 ≈ N (0, 400) ≈ 1600
Yubikey 2 [62] (Power) 8-bit HW ≈ 0.06 ≈ N (0, 1110) ≈ 4430
Stratix II Bistream [62] 8-bit HD ≈ 0.05 ≈ N (0, 1600) ≈ 6400
Mifare DesFire [63] (EM) 4-bit HD ≈ 0.01 ≈ N (0, 10000) ≈ 40000
Table 6.1. Example correlation coefficients (cc) and corresponding noise levels, de-
picted as N (µN , σ2N) and the number of corresponding noise register, of CPA attacks
on different architectures: a PIC16F886 microcontroller that is used in an RFID ac-
cess control system [62], the Yubikey One-Time Password Token that uses AES [62],
the DS2432 and DS28E01 SHA-1 HMAC protected EEPROM from Maxim Inte-
grated [62], Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 bitstream encryption based on AES-256 [57], an
AES-128 implementation on a 22nm Kintex-7 FPGA [37], and an EM attack on the
contactless Mifare Desfire smartcard (potentially with some side-channel countermea-
sures) [8]. Please note that the noise levels are only approximations based on the CPA
values provided by the cited papers and are only meant to give the reader a rough
idea of the expected noise levels in a side-channel attack.
However, this notion is only used to provide a more intuitive way of expressing the
added noise. The added Gaussian noise represents all of the different noise sources
since, as mentioned, these noise sources are assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution.
How high the noise will be for an actual device depends on too many factors to be able
to give a concrete answer. Therefore we simulate different noise levels that we assume
to be reasonable approximations of what can be expected in a real measurement. But
to give the reader an idea of the typical amount of noise in a side-channel attack,
Table 6.1 gives an overview of some successful CPA attacks and their corresponding
correlation coefficient and the corresponding amount of noise. How to calculate the
Gaussian noise for a given correlation coefficient was discussed in Section 2.1.2.
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6.2.2 Combining CPA with Machine Learning
The previous Section showed that we can distinguish PUF models that have a high
model accuracy from PUF models with a lower model accuracy using the correlation
coefficient as a metric. This indicates that power measurements can be useful in
attacking a PUF. However, due to noise it is not possible to directly read out specific
response bits from the power measurements. Therefore, machine learning techniques
such as SVM that require challenge and response pairs seem do not seem to be well
suited. But there exists a machine learning technique that works very well with
correlation power analysis: Evolution Strategies (ES). The idea of ES is to randomly
generate PUF models with different delay values and then test which of these models
perform best, i.e. which are the fittest. The fittest models are then kept as parents
for the next generation, while the other models are discarded. In the next generation,
children are derived from these parents by randomly modifying the delay values of
the parent models. In the next step the fitness of these children is evaluated and
new parents for the next generation are chosen from these children. The idea behind
this approach is that by always keeping only the best PUF models, the PUF models
gradually become more accurate. This process is repeated and eventually the PUF
models model the PUF with a very high accuracy.
Using ES to attack PUFs is not new and ES has already been successfully applied
to attack feed-forward Arbiter PUFs [71]. The advantage of ES is that it is not
based on solving any equations. For ES to work it is only necessary to have a way
to distinguish which PUF models from a given set of PUF models are the fittest.
Typically, this is done by comparing the modeled response bits with the measured
response bits. The models with the highest match rate (accuracy) are the fittest.
But any other fitness test that can distinguish good PUF models from bad PUF
models with a high probability can be used. As discussed, it is possible to use power
measurements and the correlation coefficient to distinguish PUF models that have a
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high model accuracy from models with a small model accuracy. Therefore, correlation
power analysis and ES can easily be combined: ES is used to generate potential PUF
models and correlation power analysis is used to test the fitness of these models. ES
also has the advantage that its random nature makes it quite resistant to noise. If
a good PUF model is falsely discarded and instead a worse PUF model is chosen as
a parent for the next generation, this will slow down the convergence to the optimal
solution. But as long as more good PUF models are chosen as parents than bad
models, the ES still works and can converge to a near optimal solution. This property
is very helpful for noisy environments such as the discussed power side-channel.
There are many different variants of ES that mainly differ in how the child in-
stances are derived from the parent instances. We tested several different methods
and parameters. The optimal strategy depends on many aspects such as number
of stages of the PUF, noise, available traces and the computation environment. I
tested the (µ/γ)-S approach without recombination with and without self-adoption.
This approach has previously been successfully applied to feed-forward Arbiter PUFs
in [71]. However, in my experiments the CMA-ES outperformed the (µ/γ)-ES and
performed very well among all ranges of noise level. CMA-ES uses a weighted re-
combination approach with self-adoption. Details of this machine learning attack can
be found e.g. in [35]. The same parameters as proposed in [35] were used with the
exception that we increased the child-population since we are dealing with a very
noisy environment.
6.2.3 Results
As mentioned in Section 6.2.1 the design can be attacked using two different
power models: A 1-bit Hamming weight (HW) power model in which each challenge
is independent from the previous challenge and a Hamming distance power model
(HD) that targets the shift registers where the responses are stored. Figure 6.5 shows
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the result of a combined correlation CMA-ES (referred to as CCMA-ES from here
after) using a 1-bit HW power model and a noise of N (0, 25) which is equivalent to
roughly 100 randomly switching registers. In Figure 6.6 the same attack is shown with
a 1-bit HD power model. The CCMA-ES is a non-deterministic method, hence, if run
with the same inputs, it can yield different results. In the figures 100 independent
runs with the same PUF instance and power simulations were executed. The best
run achieved an accuracy of 93.5% for the 1-bit HW power model compared to an
accuracy of 95.6% for the 1-bit HD power model. However, while all runs converged
to a solution close to the maximum in the 1-bit HW power model, in the 1-bit HD
power model several runs did not converge to a solution close to the maximum. Hence,
while the HD power model achieves higher accuracies if a run converges, there is a
much higher chance that a run does not converge for the HD power model compared
to the HW power model.
Figure 6.5. Result of a CMA-ES with a 1-bit HW power model, 150k challenges
and a noise of N (0, 25) which is equivalent to 100 switching registers.
The reason for this is that a single miss-predicted response bit actually influences
two bits in the HD power model(the current and next value). This leads to a relation
between the prediction accuracy and correlation coefficient that unlike the Hamming
weight power model is not linear. Figure 6.8 shows the relationship of accuracy
106
Figure 6.6. Result of a CMA-ES with a 1-bit HD power model, 150k challenges and
a noise of N (0, 25) which is equivalent to 100 switching registers.
Figure 6.7. Result of a CMA-ES with an 80-bit HD power model, 150k challenges
and a noise of N (0, 25) which is equivalent to 100 switching registers.
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versus correlation coefficient for the HW as well as HD power model. It is still true
for the HD power model that a higher accuracy yields a higher correlation coefficient.
However, this correlation coefficient increases slower for low accuracies compared to
higher accuracies. What this means in practice is that the HD power model does
not perform as good as the HW power model while the prediction accuracy is fairly
low. But for higher accuracies the HD model actually outperforms the HW model
since for higher accuracies the correlation coefficient increases faster in the HD model
compared to the HW model. This trend is independent of how many bits are used
for the HW power model, but an 80-bit HD model shows a higher variance from the
ideal curve than a 1-bit HD model. This explains why the HD model achieves higher
accuracies while simultaneously having a lower rate of runs that converge.
Figure 6.8. Relation between the correlation coefficient and the prediction accuracy
for the Hamming weight power model as well as the Hamming distance power model.
For this simulation 1 million random response bits were used and no noise was added.
If we assume that the result is stored in an 80-bit shift register then the power
consumption during the storing of a response bit follows an 80-bit HD power model,
not a 1-bit HD model. Using an 80-bit power model greatly increases the signal to
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noise ratio. Figure 6.7 shows the same attack as before with the 80-bit HD power
model. In this case accuracies of up to 99.9% are achieved. Therefore this power model
is recommended in practice, assuming the design allows it. It is also important to note
that in the controlled PUF a single execution of the protocol requires 80 responses,
hence, a single measurement actually contains 80 challenges. Hence, for the example
of 150k challenges this means that only around 150,000/80=1875 measurements would
be needed.
Figure 6.2.3 shows the result for the CMA-ES attack with different noise levels and
different number of traces with this 80-bit HD power model. As one can see, using
the 80-bit HD power model makes the attack very robust to noise. Even with a noise
level equivalent to 5000 randomly switching registers an accuracy of 96.5% is achieved
using only 120k challenges which can be collected with as few as 1500 measurements.
Model accuracy is only one metric to determine the success of the attack. Another
valid metric is the number of times the correct 80-bit string is predicted. The output
of the controlled PUF is the hash value of 80 response bits and therefore an attacker
can verify if he has predicted the correct 80-bit string. To correctly predict these
strings is the ultimate goal of the attacker since this will enable him to impersonate
the PUF device.
Furthermore, if the attacker manages to predict the PUF with a high enough
accuracy to find a single 80-bit match, the attacker can perform a second machine
learning attack that uses this success metric to achieve accuracy exceeding 99%. The
idea of this second machine learning attack is simple: Instead of still relying on the
(noisy) power side-channel to evaluate the fitness of the PUF models, the attacker
uses the number of string matches to determine the fitness. Otherwise the same
CMA-ES is used as with the power model. Since this string match analysis is noise
free, much larger accuracies can be achieved than with the power side-channel. Given
enough challenges, accuracies beyond 99.99% are achieved.
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Figure 6.9. Result of of 100 runs of an 80-bit CCMA-ES attack with different levels
of noise. The noise level is expressed by the number of randomly switching registers
to achieve the same amount of Gaussian noise. On the left the maximum achieved
accuracy with 100 runs is shown while on the right the number of runs that achieved
an accuracy high enough to find at least one string match is shown.
The most effective attack is therefore a two step approach: In the first stage
a combined machine learning and power side-channel attack is performed to model
the PUF with a large enough accuracy to predict some of the 80-bit strings. In the
second step, a machine learning attack using the number of string matches as a fitness
function is used to achieve prediction accuracies beyond 99%. Figure 6.10 shows the
required number of 80-bits strings for different PUF accuracies to find a match with a
probability of at least 50%. This figure can be used to roughly determine the needed
model accuracy that needs to be achieved using the power side-channel attack so that
in a second step a CMA-ES based on string matches can be performed. For example,
with an accuracy of 90% only about 10k traces are needed to find a string match.
To reliably find a string match with 1 million traces an accuracy of 85% or better is
required.
I tested this two-step approach by adding noise to the power measurement equiv-
alent to a million random switching registers and the first step based on the power
consumption achieved a model accuracy of 88%, which was enough to launch a sec-
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Figure 6.10. The number of needed strings so that the probability of a match is at
least 50%.
ond machine learning attack based on string matches with this output to successfully
model the PUF with an accuracy of 99.99% using 10 million challenges (for which only
128k measurements are needed). Table 6.2 gives an overview of the required number
of traces for different noise levels so that at least one string match is found. In each
case it was then possible to achieve accuracies beyond 99% with the second machine
learning attack. Table 6.3 shows the same analysis for the 1-bit HW power model.
These noise levels are very large while the required number of traces is comparably
small for a side-channel attack. Hence, it is reasonable to say that power side-channel
attacks on controlled PUFs are successful even in the presence of considerable noise.
6.3 Fault Attack on Arbiter PUFs
So far we have seen that Arbiter PUFs are vulnerable to passive side-channel
attacks. In this section we will take a closer look at their resistance against active
attacks. It was often assumed that the fact that the PUF changes its behavior if it is
being tampered with increases the security of PUFs against implementation attacks.
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Noise Registers Challenges Traces Accuracy String match
0 30,000 375 97 Yes
100 30,000 375 97 Yes
1,000 50,000 625 95 Yes
10,000 150,000 1,875 93 Yes
100,000 1,000,000 12,500 93.6 Yes
1,000,000 10,000,000 125,000 88.2 Yes
Table 6.2. Required number of challenges for different noise levels to achieve an
accuracy large enough to find a string match with an 80-Bit HD power model. With
such a string match a second machine learning algorithm achieved accuracies beyond
99%.
Noise Registers Challenges Traces Accuracy String match
100 80,000 1,000 89 Yes
500 450,000 5,625 90 Yes
1,000 750,000 9,375 89 Yes
5,000 4,000,000 50,000 87 Yes
10,000 7,500,000 93,750 88 Yes
Table 6.3. Required number of challenges for different noise levels to achieve an
accuracy large enough to find a string match with a 1-Bit HW power model. With
such a string match a second machine learning algorithm achieved accuracies beyond
99%.
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However, in this Section we will see that the unreliability information can instead be
used to successfully model a controlled PUF.
6.3.1 Impact of Noise on Arbiter PUFs
Arbiter PUFs have a problem with unreliability in practice, which means that the
same challenge does not always generate the same response. There are two sources
that can cause an Arbiter PUF to change its response bit: thermal noise and changes
in environmental conditions. Thermal noise adds approximately Gaussian noise to the
delay value of each individual execution of the PUF. If the delay difference between
the top and bottom signal is small for a given challenge, this noise can switch the
response bit by changing a previously positive delay difference into a negative delay
difference and vise versa. The closer the delay difference is to zero, the more likely it
is that the response bit changes.
The second reason why a response bit might flip is due to changes in the environ-
ment. For example, it is well known that changing the supply voltage or operation
temperature changes the propagation delay and rise and fall time of a CMOS transis-
tor. The magnitude of this change depends directly on the transistor sizing as well as
the process variations. Hence, the Arbiter PUF behaves differently at different supply
voltages. For each challenge the delay difference will either increase or decrease when
the supply voltage is reduced. The amount of the increase or decrease depends on
the PUF instance as well as the challenge.
This has some interesting implications. First of all, the attack by Delvaux et.al. [25]
does not work with environmental noise in the same way as it does with thermal noise.
The added delay is not Gaussian but a function of the supply voltage (or other en-
vironmental conditions) whose slope depends on the PUF instance as well as the
challenge. Since the slope of the function is different for each challenge two chal-
lenges that have the same delay difference might behave differently when the supply
113
voltage is altered. One challenge might flip while the other does not. Nevertheless, if
the delay difference is close to 0 it is much more likely that the response bit flips than
if the absolute delay difference is large. In Figure 6.11 the delay differences for an
128-bit Arbiter PUF is shown. The delay difference is approximately Gaussian and
ranges between -150ps and +150ps. When the supply voltage was altered from the
nominal voltage of 1.1V to 1V and 1.2V roughly 6% of the response bits flipped. In
Figure 6.11 the delay difference of the challenges that flipped are depicted in black.
Only traces that were close to zero (between -12ps and +13 ps) flipped. The distribu-
tion of the delay difference of the flipped traces is again approximately Gaussian and
the closer to zero the more likely that the response flipped. However, while a trace
whose absolute delay difference was larger than 13ps never flipped, a lot of traces
whose delay difference were less than 13ps did not flip. Hence, it is not possible to
directly read out the delay difference from the information when a challenge flips.
However, we still get enough information to reliably model the PUF as we will see in
the following.
Figure 6.11. The delay difference in pico seconds between the top and bottom
signal after the last stage for 49k traces. Colored in blue are the delay differences of
all traces and in black are the delay differences for the traces whose output flipped
when the supply voltage was changed from 1.1V to 1V and 1.2V.
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For the controlled PUF design from Section 6.1.3 to be useful an Arbiter PUF with
a high reliability is needed. Ideally, the PUF should be resistant to thermal noise and
changes in the environmental conditions. However, this is very difficult to achieve for
all possible environmental conditions. Therefore, it is much more likely that the PUF
will be designed to be reliable under normal operation conditions as defined in the
specifications. For example, techniques such as the once described in [23] can help
to counteract changes in temperature or supply voltage. Usually, these techniques
are optimized for a small range of operating conditions and will not work outside
the specification of the device. Furthermore, it is likely that the controlled PUF will
depend on a stable voltage source or that the protocol allows to collect challenges and
responses for different working conditions. Hence, even if a controlled PUF might be
very reliable under normal working conditions, it is reasonable to assume that an
attacker with access to the device can alter the environmental conditions to make the
PUF unreliable. In particular, it is likely that an attacker with physical access to the
PUF is able to apply a supply voltage that is outside of the specifications.
In the following, we will again assume that a controlled PUF design as described
in Section 6.1.3 is used. We furthermore assume that the attacker can alter the
voltage supply in a way that the chip is still functioning but some PUF responses
will flip. The advantage of changing the supply voltage compared to e.g. changing
the temperature is that it can be done easily in a fast and automatic fashion. It is
possible to build a set-up that will alter the supply voltage of the chip for only a
few clock cycles. This has the advantage that only one or a few challenges of the
challenges in the controlled PUF design will be subject to the altered supply voltage.
Other environmental changes, e.g. generating a strong magnetic field might have the
same or similar effects. What kind of faults are feasible and effective besides voltage
manipulations is an interesting future research direction. Basically any change to the
PUF that can be applied to a single challenge (or few challenges) and that changes
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the delay difference so that only a subset of response bits flip can be used for our
fault attack.
We performed Monte Carlo simulations using HSpice for an 128-bit Arbiter PUF in
45nm technology with a nominal voltage of 1.1V and with 1V and 1.2V and compared
the response bits to determine which responses flip when the voltage is altered. It
turns out that when reducing the voltage from 1.1V to 1V only 1.9% of the responses
flipped while increasing the voltage from 1.1V to 1.2V resulted in 4.5% of flipped
bits. One reason why increasing the voltage had larger effects on the responses is
that the standard cells we used were optimized for usage of 1.1V and 1V but not for
1.2V3. In total 6% of the challenges flipped and only 0.4% of the challenges flipped
for both a voltage reduction as well as voltage increase. In the following, data from
these simulations are used to test our fault attack.
6.3.2 Combined Machine Learning Fault Attack
The same CMA-ES machine learning method as in the combined power side-
channel and machine learning attack is used for the combined machine learning fault
attack. Recall that it is necessary to be able to distinguish PUF models that have a
high model accuracy from PUF models with a low model accuracy for an ES machine
learning attack to work. In Section 6.2.2 this was done using the power side-channel.
Instead, in this attack the reliability information of the PUF under supply voltage
manipulations is used to judge the PUF models. The basic idea is to take mea-
surements of the same challenges with different supply voltages and check for which
challenges the response changed. If the response bit for challenge i flipped we assign
Fi = 1 otherwise Fi = 0. From Figure 6.11 we know that if a response bit flipped it
is very likely that the corresponding delay difference was close to zero i.e. |∆D| < τ .
3Note that this can also be due to the fact that the HSpice simulations are more accurate the
closer you simulate to the nominal operation conditions.
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1 if |∆Dˆi| < τˆ
0 if |∆Dˆi| > τˆ
One way to check the fitness of the PUF model is to compare the hypothesis vector
Fˆ with the measured vector F by counting how often the two vectors are equal, i.e.,
∑ |Fi − Fˆi| . Intuitively, the correct PUF model should have the smallest difference
between the two vectors. However, using the number of mismatches is not very good
to measure the fitness of the PUF instances. The number of flipped bits is relatively
small and as seen in Figure 6.11, not all bits flip if |∆D| < τ . Hence, even for the
correct PUF model there is a mismatch between F and Fˆ , i.e.
∑ |Fi−Fˆi| > 0. A PUF
model that results in a vector Fˆi = 0 for all i might therefore have a smaller mismatch
between Fˆ and F than a PUF model with a high model accuracy. Therefore, using
the number of mismatches as the fitness test does not work in practice. Using the
correlation coefficient between F and Fˆ on the other hand works very well. Hence,
the correlation coefficient is used again to determine the fitness of the PUF models.
Compared to the CMA-ES based on power side-channels, the fault based CMA-ES
needs to model the parameter τ in addition to the n + 1 delay values. But otherwise
there is not much difference between the two attacks.
Figure 6.12 shows the result of the fault CMA-ES with 8k traces and +/- 0.1V
supply voltage variation. The attack can model the PUF reliably with an accuracy
of 97.7%. From 100 runs 56 runs achieved an accuracy of at least 97% with a com-
putation time of 70 minutes for all 100 runs. These results represent an ideal case
without any noise. However, when performing this attack in practice there might be
measurement errors in the fault trace F . In the controlled PUF case we assume that
we can alter the operating conditions for only a single sub-challenge while keeping the
operating conditions constant for the other 79 sub-challenges. Since the 80 response
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Figure 6.12. The result of 100 runs of the CMA-ES Fault attack with 8k traces
and +/− 0.1V supply voltage variation without additional noise. On the left the
accuracy of the resulting PUF models are shown. On the right side the number of
80-bit strings that were correctly predicted by the PUF models are shown.
Figure 6.13. The result of 100 runs of the CMA-ES Fault attack with 45k traces
and +/− 0.1V supply voltage variation with 20% faulty responses.
bits are fed through a hash function we can see if at least one response bit flipped
by checking if the hash value changed. But since a hash function is used, it is not
possible to determine which response bit has changed or how many. It can therefore
happen that a response bit flip is detected although it actually corresponds to a flip in
one of the 79 sub-challenges that are not targeted. We call this case a “false positive”
since Fi is set to one although no flip actually happened for the targeted challenge.
Besides a “false positive” there could also be a “false negative” in which a response
bit that is supposed to flip does not flip, e.g. because the fault setup did not work
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correctly. It is likely that the closer |∆D| is to zero the more unlikely it is that a false
negative happens for this challenge. False negatives as well as false positives can be
reduced by repeating the measurement several times. It could also happen that the
targeted challenge flips due to noise instead of the voltage alteration. However, if a
challenge flips due to noise it is likely that the delay difference is close to zero as well,
i.e. |∆D| < τn. Hence, whether the response flips due to noise or voltage alteration
does not matter as long as τn ≤ τ .
We tested how the attack works in the presence of these noise sources. We ran-
domly changed 20% of the bits of F which represents a false positive rate of 20%
and a false negative rate of 20%4. Figure 6.13 shows the result of a CMA-ES attack
with 45k challenges with 20% overall noise. The attack still works and achieves the
same accuracy as the noiseless case. However, the number of challenges needed to
attack the PUF increased from 8k challenges to 45k challenges and more runs are un-
successful than in the noise-free case. Nevertheless, the number of challenges is still
fairly low considering the rather large amount of noise added. Figure 6.14 shows the
success of the attack with different noise levels and different numbers of challenges.
Figure 6.14. Result of a Fault CMA-ES attack with 200 independent runs for
different levels of overall-noise and for different numbers of challenges. On the left
the highest achieved model accuracy is shown while the right figure shows the number
of runs that had at least one string match.
4Since we change the bits independent of |∆D| this can be seen as a worst case scenario.
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As can be seen, the attack still works in the presence of considerable noise. Hence,
fault attacks on controlled PUFs based on Arbiter PUFs are feasible. The presumed
strength, that tampering with the PUF results in different responses, turns out to
actually be a security vulnerability. One can therefore no longer state that Arbiter
PUFs are more resistant to implementation and probing attacks than traditional
cryptography5.
6.4 Implications of Side-Channel Attacks on Arbiter PUFs
The results presented in this chapter show that — unlike often believed — Arbiter
PUFs are not considerably more resistant against side-channel attacks than traditional
cryptographic algorithms. So where does this leave us? We already knew that Arbiter
PUFs have some serious problems with machine learning attacks and reliability. But
due to the nice property that PUFs work without the need to program a key, their
lightweight nature in terms of area and power, and their presumable resistance to
implementation attacks, Arbiter PUF have gained a lot of research attention despite
these known problems. However, now that we know that this assumed strength
against implementation attacks does not hold, are Arbiter PUFs still a promising
solution?
Without adding considerable non-linearity to the Arbiter PUFs, the problem of
machine learning attacks remain. But when adding such non-linearity e.g. by using
a controlled PUF or by adding a high amount of XOR PUFs, the Arbiter PUF looses
much of its lightweight nature. And there already exist very lightweight cryptographic
algorithms as alternatives such as lightweight block ciphers or stream ciphers. This
raises strong doubts whether Arbiter PUFs are significantly more lightweight than
traditional cryptographic solutions.
5It is also possible to attack the PUF by probing a digital signal in the post-processing of the
controlled PUF design.
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Therefore, the only remaining advantage of Arbiter PUF compared to traditional
cryptography is its property that the “secret” does not need to be programed nor that
secure non-volatile memory is needed to store a key. This is indeed a nice property
e.g. in a product authentication setting. However, for the application of generating
keys, weak PUFs can be used as well. Hence, the competition for Arbiter PUF in this
case is not traditional cryptography but weak PUFs such as Ring-Oscillator PUFs and
memory based PUFs. That weak PUFs are a promising security primitive is known,
with commercial solutions already available.
So what is the advantage of using an Arbiter PUF compared to using a weak
PUF combined with a traditional cryptographic algorithm such as a hash function
to establish a challenge and response protocol? It seems that using a weak PUF
combined with traditional cryptography is a much more solid solution with a much
higher understanding of the security implications. Of course, Arbiter PUFs can also
be used as weak PUFs to generate cryptographic keys, but then they should also be
treated as weak PUFs and not a strong PUFs.
When Arbiter PUFs were first proposed, it boosted a whole new research area:
that of strong PUFs. The idea was very promising, but we should admit that Arbiter
PUFs have too many problems to be a secure and reliable solution for challenge-
and-response protocols. It is about time that the research community admits that
Arbiter PUFs are actually weak PUFs — not strong PUFs — and cannot be used for
challenge-and-response protocols. Unfortunately, no alternative to delay based PUFs
as an electrical strong PUF has emerged so far. Instead of focusing on improving
a failed method, the research should focus on finding alternative and novel ideas to
build strong PUFs. Otherwise, it is much more promising to research how weak PUFs
can be combined with traditional cryptography to solve the problems that were hoped
to be solved with strong PUFs. Such a solution is much more promising than trying




The heavy use of outsourcing and globalization in the embedded system design
process brings many security challenges. This thesis shows that side-channel analysis
can be a tool for an malicious attacker to build stealthy hardware Trojans but also
a tool that can be used to protect your intellectual property in embedded systems.
IP theft is a serious concern for companies working in the embedded systems market.
The business model of many companies in the embedded systems market is to sell
IP-cores or software libraries for embedded systems. However, often these companies
have to provided access to their IP-cores and libraries to potential customers since the
costumers often want to test these designs. But companies have no guarantee that
these costumers handle the IP responsible and that they do not use them unless they
paid for it. Detecting IP theft and proofing this misuse is very difficult in embedded
systems. The side-channel based hardware and software watermarks presented in this
thesis address this issue. The major advantage of these side-channel based watermarks
is that it is possible to verify the presence of the watermark without access to the
design details of the embedded system. All that is required to detect the watermark
is access to the chip under test to perform power or EM side-channel measurements.
This feature makes side-channels a perfect candidate to detect IP theft in embedded
systems, since a verifier usually does not have access to the design details of the device
under test.
But IP theft is not the only problem that the outsourcing and globalization of the
embedded system design process has brought. Hardware Trojans are an increasing
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concern. One fear is that foreign governments might put pressure on companies to
insert back doors into the embedded systems. Most companies in the embedded
system market are “fab-less”, i.e., they do not have their on factories but outsource
the manufacturing process to a different company. Often these factories are located in
different countries. As the Snowden revelations about the practices of the NSA show,
some governments put pressure on their IT industry to build in backdoors for their
secret agencies. Although no reports are known in which a semiconductor factory
inserted a hardware Trojan, it seems that this is a realistic threat.
Therefore, reliable methods are needed to detect hardware Trojans inserted at the
manufacturing level. But to build efficient detection mechanisms, one first needs to
understand how hardware Trojans can be build. In this thesis an extremely stealthy
method of how to build hardware Trojans is introduced. The dopant Trojans are
realized by only modifying the design below the transistor level. No additional tran-
sistors or metal wires are inserted. Two case studies proof that this technique can
be used to build meaningful hardware Trojans that will likely pass currently pro-
posed Trojan detection mechanisms. These new Trojans give important insight in
how stealthy hardware Trojans can be in practice and highlight that better Trojan
detection mechanisms are needed.
Besides IP-theft and hardware Trojans, counterfeits are another major concern
in the embedded system market. These counterfeits not only steal revenue from
the manufacturer of the IC but also cause serious problems for the company who
unknowingly uses them in their products. The counterfeit ICs are often much less
reliable than the original ICs and often have different specifications compromising the
performance and reliability of the entire end-product.
The side-channel based hardware watermarks used to detect IP theft can be ex-
tended to also be used to detect counterfeit ICs by storing the watermark in pro-
grammable memory. Another previously proposed anti-counterfeit mechanism is the
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use of PUFs. For the anti-counterfeiting application a strong PUF is needed, i.e.,
a PUF with a challenge space large enough that trying all challenges is computa-
tionally infeasible. But building strong PUFs is very difficult and the currently most
promising approach, the delay based PUFs, suffer from unreliability issues and, most
importantly, vulnerability towards machine learning attacks. Nevertheless, Arbiter
PUFs have gained a lot of attention. PUFs are often assumed to be more resistant
against side-channel attacks, making them a very interesting for embedded systems.
However, this side-channel resistance was never proven. As it turns out, by com-
bining side-channel analysis with machine learning, it is possible to perform power
side-channel attacks as well as fault attacks on Arbiter PUFs. The results presented
in this paper show that even Arbiter designs that are resistant against machine learn-
ing attacks, such as a controlled PUF, are vulnerable. However, if delay based PUFs
are not more resistant against implementation attacks than traditional cryptogra-
phy, they loose much of their presumed strength. It is therefore the question if delay
based PUF really should be considered strong PUFs and if they really are a promising
security solution.
In summary, side-channel analysis is an extremely versatile tool with many mali-
cious, but also constructive uses in embedded systems.
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